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I. Introduction 
Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise. A stitch in 
time saves nine. ~ Benjamin Franklin 
i. March 29th, 1937 
 On Monday, March 29th, 1937, fifty three thousand people gathered on the 
South Lawn of the White House. However, despite continued economic uncertainty 
highlighted by talks of an imminent recession, these people did not gather for a 
strike, demonstration or protest. Rather, they came for the annual Easter Egg Roll 
celebration hosted by President Roosevelt.1   
 The mood at the Supreme Court could not have been any different than the 
mood at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. When Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes 
greeted a courtroom filled with roughly 4,000 attendees, tension filled the room. 
The Court, after all, had been the greatest obstacle to Roosevelt’s New Deal since its 
inception, and onlookers were anxious to see if this would continue.  
 As Hughes proceeded to announce the outcome of five cases from the 
previous term, one case, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, was of particular interest. 
Here, the defendants argued that the minimum wage law in the State of 
Washington—which mandated that women be paid a minimum of 30 cents per 
hour—was unconstitutional.  
 Those arguing that the law was unconstitutional had recent Supreme Court 
precedents in their favor. In 1923, the Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital ruled 
                                                        
1 Shesol, Jeff, Supreme Power, W.W. Norton & Company 2010, pg. 403 
 5 
that federal minimum wage laws were unconstitutional pursuant to an implied 
“liberty of contract.” As the Justice Sutherland wrote in the majority opinion, “liberty 
of contract” could be understood as the right of a twenty one-year old elevator 
operator and her boss to negotiate with “equal rights to obtain […] the best terms 
they can.”2 This right to contract was found, for “Sutherland and other court 
conservatives,” in “the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,” which 
“protected private contracts from federal economic [regulatory] legislation.”3  
 The Adkins affirmation of a “liberty of contract” was further validated less 
than one year prior to Parrish in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936). In 
Morehead, the Court ruled by a 5-4 margin that a New York minimum wage law, 
similar to the Washington D.C. statute at question in Adkins, was unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, in the majority opinion penned by Justice Butler, the Adkins principle 
was declared “sound” and it was stated, “The Adkins case controls.” “Freedom of 
contract,” Butler wrote, “is the general rule and restraint is the exception.”4 
 Thus, when the Parrish decision was announced on March 29th, few surmised 
that the Court would uphold the State of Washington’s minimum wage law. 
However, that is exactly what the Court decided in a 5-4 ruling. As Burt Solomon put 
it in his account of the turbulent period, “the reversal was blunt, and 
unembarrassed, and a shock.”5 
 The “reversal,” was due to the vote of one judge, Associate Justice Owen 
Roberts. In the Morehead case, Roberts had voted with the 5-4 majority to uphold 
                                                        
2 Ibid. pg. 219 
3 Simon, James F., FDR and Chief Justice Hughes, Simon & Schuster 2012, pg. 182 
4 Butler, Pierce, Morehead v. People of State of New York 298 U.S. 587, 1936 
5 Solomon, Burt, FDR v. The Constitution. Walker & Company 2009, pg. 158 
 6 
the Adkins precedent and strike down the minimum wage law. Nine months later, in 
Parrish, Justice Roberts had again voted with the majority, but this time to affirm the 
law and reverse the Adkins precedent. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority 
in Parrish, asked of the so-called liberty of contract:” “What is this freedom? The 
constitution does not speak of freedom of contract [….] freedom of contract is a 
qualified, and not an absolute, right.”6 
 The day that Parrish was announced soon became known as “White Monday,” 
which counteracted 1935’s “Black Monday.” Black Monday referred to May 27th, 
1935, when the Supreme Court ruled that the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(“NIRA”) and Frazier-Lemke Act —key pieces of President Roosevelt’s “New Deal” 
initiative—were unconstitutional.7 This ruling was the latest in a series of rebuffs 
that the Supreme Court leveled at the New Deal, having previously struck down the 
Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act and the Railroad Act. In the next year, the Court ruled 
the Coal Conservation Act and Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional as well. 
Three of these five laws were struck down by 6-3 or 5-4 margins. The other two 
decisions were unanimous. In each case, Justice Roberts had voted with the 
conservative majority. The Supreme Court had “made mincemeat of the Roosevelt 
New Deal.”8 
 The Parrish decision marked a turning point. Only weeks after Parrish, Justice 
Roberts voted in favor of the Social Security Act in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and 
affirmed the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in National Labor Relations Board v. 
                                                        
6 Hughes, Charles, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379, 1937 
7 Shesol, Supreme Power, pgs. 127-130 
8 Ball, Howard. Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior. Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 90 
 7 
Jones & Laughlin Steel. Roberts was the deciding vote in each: Davis and Laughlin 
were both 5-4 rulings. 
 With the death or retirement of five Supreme Court justices in the two-year 
span thereafter, President Roosevelt was able to solidify the Court as primarily pro-
New Deal, appointing allies such as longtime confidant Felix Frankfurter and 
Solicitor General Stanley Reed to the bench. 
 Oddly, for such an important moment in history, Justice Roberts’s vote switch 
from Morehead to Parrish has no consensus that explains its occurrence. There are 
those who insist that President Roosevelt’s proposed Judicial Reorganization Bill of 
1937 (colloquially known as the “court packing” plan) forced Justice Roberts’s hand. 
Others say the election of 1936—which saw Roosevelt reelected in a landslide—
influenced Justice Roberts to change his opinion. Still, others argue that these 
outside factors had no such bearing on Roberts; rather, his vote in Parrish was not 
surprising and could have been anticipated.  
 This paper seeks to provide a contemporary analysis of this watershed 
moment in American politics and draw us closer to understanding the great 
conundrum: Why did Justice Roberts switch his vote? 
 
ii. Research Design 
a. Context 
 Following this Introduction, Part II of this research provides important 
contextual information, including the biography and perception of Justice Roberts. 
This section includes an analysis of a prior “vote switch” by Justice Roberts 
 8 
overlooked in previous studies. Taken together, this section details Roberts’s 
upbringing, ideology and jurisprudence. 
 
b. Question One: Did a Predictable Switch Occur? 
 Part III addresses the first of two necessary questions in uncovering the 
reasons underlying the Parrish vote. Was Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish sudden 
and unpredictable? Or was the vote in Parrish more predictable; could it have been 
anticipated? 
 The Parrish outcome has aroused scholastic debate and interest since it was 
announced in 1937. In the Morehead case, the majority wrote that the Adkins 
precedent was “sound.” In the Parrish opinion nine months later, the majority 
declared that the Adkins principle “should be, and is, overruled.”9 By virtue of 
signing onto each majority opinion, and by refusing to clarify his jurisprudence in 
concurring opinions, the nickname a “switch in time saves nine” soon debuted to 
explain Roberts’s vote.10 
 However, it is not completely clear that Justice Roberts’s vote switch was as 
unpredictable as it may appear. Since the mid 1990’s, many scholars—most notably 
Barry Cushman—have argued that Parrish should have been expected, and was 
simply a result of Roberts’s evolving jurisprudence. 
 This question is important in several regards. It is generally assumed that 
Justice Roberts had a sudden, unpredictable switch from Morehead to Parrish, best 
epitomized by the continued use of the “switch in time” phrase. However, this 
                                                        
9 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution, pg. 158 
10 Ibid. pg. 162.  
 9 
debased assumption confines the realm of possibilities and leads to an unproven 
conclusion; there had to be an impetus, or ulterior motive, behind this “sudden” 
shift. However, if Parrish was predictable, then this naturally alters the conclusion 
behind the “switch” itself and lessens the likelihood of an exterior motive. In this 
scenario, a more technical parsing—such as differences in the wording of the laws in 
Morehead and Parrish—could explain the supposed discrepancy. 
 Felix Frankfurter, a close advisor to President Roosevelt, best summarized 
these competing notions. In a letter to Roosevelt after the Parrish decision had been 
rendered, Frankfurter called Roberts’s vote switch “irreconcilable.”11 However, in 
1955, Frankfurter recanted that assertion and called the alleged vote switch a 
“ludicrous illustration” of which “this false charge against Justice Roberts must be 
dissipated.”12 
 To gauge the predictability of Parrish, it follows that a close study of the cases 
preceding it must be examined. Dissecting cases before Parrish allows one to 
develop a trend by which Roberts’s vote in Parrish can be accurately understood.  
 One such study focuses on mathematical modeling of Supreme Court 
decisions per voting bloc. The goal of such modeling, as employed by Daniel Ho and 
Kevin Quinn in a recent study of Roberts’s voting history, is to detect sudden 
changes in voting patterns. This style of quantitative insight is similar in nature to 
                                                        
11 Ho, Daniel & Quinn, Kevin, “Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?” CELS 2009 4th Annual 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper 2009, pg. 3 
12 Frankfurter, Felix, “Mr. Justice Roberts,” The University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Vol. 104 
No. 3, December 1955, p. 313  
 10
what credit companies use to detect credit card fraud—identifying sudden breaks in 
purchasing patterns. 13 
 However, this method has certain limitations. Primarily, such modeling does 
not discriminate amongst cases by category or issue. The substantive addition I 
make to the existing statistical data surveying Justice Roberts is in this qualitative 
realm. By gathering the totality of Justice Roberts’s votes in Supreme Court cases 
from 1930-1937, the research herein analyzes an original dataset that is narrowed 
by relevancy to Parrish. Essentially, the dataset seeks to rectify the major flaw in the 
Ho & Quinn model, which is that it does not distinguish between case issue and 
category. This original dataset allows for the closest possible look at cases that are 
most similar to Parrish in topic and vote-margin. 
 
 c. Question Two: Why Did the “Switch in Time” Occur? 
 Part IV builds off of Part III and examines why Roberts voted the way he did 
in Parrish. The first question, focusing on predictability of Parrish, is designed to 
give this second research question context and a spectrum of possible explanations. 
For example, finding that an unpredictable switch on Roberts’s behalf occurred in 
the Parrish case presents a range of possibilities for why he underwent an 
unpredictable shift. Conversely, concluding that Roberts’s vote in Parrish was very 
much predictable confers a differing range of possible conclusions to this second 
question.  
                                                        
13 Ho & Quinn, “Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?” pg. 4  
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 Uncovering why the switch occurred focuses mainly on a trio of qualitative, 
historical, and primary sources. There is a bevy of academic literature that seeks to 
answer—or at least provide a measure of clarity—to this question. This paper uses 
these academic and scholarly foundations to reach novel conclusions, specifically 
concerning individual actors, institutions, and dynamics of the time period. 
 However, the approach to this second question is limited to scholarly works 
spanning the two divides, which have been dubbed the “Internal” and “External” 
camps. These resources provide a good foundation for research, yet they do not tell 
the entire story. As a result, primary research focuses on qualitative historical 
relationships between individuals and within institutions. These include, but are not 
limited to, roles played by President Roosevelt, Chief Justice Hughes, Felix 
Frankfurter, and Justice Roberts in the occurrence of the vote switch. Institutionally, 
research focuses on the Supreme Court, the Republican Party and the American 
Liberty League, exclusively and as interacting dynamos.  
 Primary sources are of great value in this research. Newspaper and press 
releases that have been gathered reveal specific intentions and perceptions of the 
aforementioned actors and institutions. Published correspondence between 
President Roosevelt and Felix Frankfurter as well as the published memos of Chief 
Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts (although the latter destroyed almost the 
entirety of his manuscripts and papers) allow this research to dig deeper into the 
inner machinations of the men themselves. 
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d. Overview of Results 
 Part V discusses results, findings, and conclusions. This research advocates 
for two underpinnings of the “switch in time.” First, the original dataset compiled (in 
addressing Question One) verifies that a switch of both the unanticipated and 
unpredictable variety did occur in 1937. Secondly, the dataset also indicates that a 
pronounced change in Roberts’s jurisprudence occurred in the latter half of the 
1934 term and persisted until the Parrish vote. These years indicate a conservative 
shift, which made Roberts’s pro-labor rights vote in Parrish so surprising in the first 
place.  
 Thus, there is a need to explain not only Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish, but 
also the conservative trend that he developed in the years prior; it was a trend that 
deviated starkly from a more liberal jurisprudence that he displayed from 1930-
1933. This paper, by incorporating previous findings with original research, is the 
first one of its kind to advance the notion (as a primary argument) that much of 
Justice Owen Roberts’s “somersault”14 stance on New Deal issues was due to the fact 
that Roberts deeply entertained the notion of running for President on the 
Republican ticket against President Roosevelt in 1936.  
 There is ample, original evidence to support such an assertion. Roberts was 
not only consistently mentioned among the national press as a viable candidate, but 
                                                        
14 Kalman, Laura, “The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal” The American 
Historical Review Vol. 110 No. 4, 2005, Par. 1 
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was sought after by the American Liberty League, an avidly anti-New Deal “pro-
constitution” organization that led the charge against FDR from 1934-1936. Roberts 
openly advocated for the same fundamental position on issues as the Liberty 
League, and maintained a host of close and personal connections to some of the 
most important political leaders and financiers of the group. It seems clear that 
Justice Owen Roberts was in many ways guided by a desire to seek the Presidency, a 
fact that explains not only the Parrish vote, but also, quite importantly, the 
conservative trend that preceded it. The Parrish vote, by extension, was the vote of a 
Justice who had been ridiculed—even by those in his own party— for his Morehead 
stance; it was also the vote of a Justice who recognized that public opinion had 
crystallized against him after Roosevelt won reelection in November of 1936 by 
historical proportions. 
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II. Background & Jurisprudence 
 
 
“But can I be a lawyer and be honest?” The headmaster stood and put his hands on his 
student’s shoulder. “Owen, you can be honest at anything.”15 
 
i. The Background and Biography of Owen Roberts 
 A study of Roberts’s vote in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish cannot be confined to 
merely examining votes, compiling patterns, or trolling through accounts of the 
turbulent period. The essence of individuality carries with it the implicit knowledge 
that one’s unique background and experience affects one’s decision-making. Thus, a 
survey into the background of Justice Owen Roberts is necessary for contextual 
purposes.  
a. Rise to Supreme Court Justice 
 Owen Josephus Roberts was born to a fairly well to do family in Germantown, 
Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia, on May 2nd, 1875. His father, Josephus 
Roberts, was the son of Welsh immigrants and made a living initially as a wagon 
maker, before co-owning a wholesale hardware business in Philadelphia. He also 
dabbled in politics, spending two terms on the Philadelphia Common Council as a 
Republican. His success allowed him to send Owen to the Germantown Academy, an 
elite prep school, and then the University of Pennsylvania at the age of sixteen.16 
                                                        
15 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution pg. 55 
16 Ibid. pg. 54 
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 After succeeding at the University of Pennsylvania, in both academics 
(selected to Phi Beta Kappa, the exclusive social science honors society) and extra-
curricular activities (editor-in-chief of the student newspaper, and the chairman of 
the yearbook committee) Roberts followed up on a burgeoning interest in law by 
enrolling in the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
 Roberts's career began its ascent while studying law at the University of 
Pennsylvania. He became part of the “University crowd, ” a group whose members 
“dominated the politics and economics of Pennsylvania.”17 He also began a 
relationship with George Wharton Pepper, a corporate and insurance law professor 
at Penn Law. Wharton Pepper would later become a United States Senator, and is 
credited with introducing Roberts to President Coolidge, which provided his first 
foray into politics.18 
 After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1898, 
Roberts began his career as an assistant prosecutor for the District Attorney of 
Philadelphia. Upon leaving public service in 1904, Roberts became a lawyer for 
Philadelphia Rapid Transit, a powerful Philadelphia streetcar corporation. In 1912, 
he began a private practice with two others, and he represented a variety of 
corporate clients, including Pennsylvania Railroad, Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania, 
Drexel & Company and the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce.19  
 Roberts first became involved in national politics in 1924 at age 39, at the 
outbreak of the “Teapot Dome” scandal. At the recommendation of his mentor 
                                                        
17 Geldreich, Gill Robert, "Justice Owen Roberts's Revolution of 1937" (1997). University of 
Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/216 pg. 5 
18 Leonard, Charles, A Search For a Judicial Philosophy, Kennikat Press 1971, pgs. 8-9 
19 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution pg. 56 
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Wharton Pepper, who by then had been elected a U.S. Senator, Roberts was 
appointed as a special federal prosecutor in co-charge of investigating the alleged 
malfeasance. Roberts’s name was seconded by Harlan Stone Fisk, a close friend of 
President Coolidge, and by Charles Evans Hughes, Coolidge’s secretary of state. 
Roberts’s “plain-spoken manner” was said to appeal to Coolidge, who sought to pair 
a Republican with a Democrat in charge of the investigation. There was initial 
concern amongst some Senators that Roberts was too friendly towards corporations 
and thus would not be impartial in the Teapot Dome investigation. In a 1923 
conference for bankers in New York, Roberts advocated for “old-fashioned Anglo-
Saxon individualism,” defended $100,000 compensation for Standard Oil executives, 
and chided “noisy minorities” for “running to the legislators every year for 
government and state regulations of all sorts of businesses.”20 Although the Senate 
debated Roberts’s nomination, he was eventually confirmed with only 8 dissenting 
votes.21 
 Roberts found success as a federal investigator; as Literary Digest wrote, 
“fame struck Owen J. Roberts with the swiftness of lightning.”22 The secretary of the 
interior, Albert B. Fall, had been convicted of accepting a six-figure bribe, and 
Roberts was dubbed “Sherlock Holmes” by the press.23 
 When Supreme Court Associate Justice Edward Sanford suddenly died in 
March of 1930, President Hoover selected 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John J. 
Parker as Sanford’s replacement.  
                                                        
20 Ibid. pg. 57 
21 Ibid. pgs. 58-59 
22 Ibid. pg. 58 
23 Ibid. pg. 59 
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 However, Parker’s nomination erupted a controversy. The NAACP alleged 
that Parker had made a statement in 1920 “against the advancement of that race in 
politics,” and organized labor vehemently opposed Parker due to an anti-union 
ruling he made in 1927. Parker was subsequently rejected by the Senate. Two days 
thereafter, Hoover submitted Roberts’s name to the Senate as a Supreme Court 
nominee. Hoover desired a quick confirmation, and some speculated that Roberts’s 
ideology would not be as easy to pin down as Parker’s was.24 
 At the time, Roberts's political leanings and judicial philosophy were of great 
mystery to the press and political punditry. While the magazine Outlook surmised 
that Roberts would “not infrequently, side with Holmes, Stone and Brandeis” (the 
Court’s liberal bloc), the New York Herald-Tribune called Roberts a “metropolitan 
corporation lawyer,” and “as conservative as Justice Parker.”25 There was also a 
contingent of the media that declared Roberts’s philosophy a wild card. As the 
Baltimore Sun editorialized, “Neither the liberals nor conservatives can be 
absolutely certain in which direction his mind will move.”26 
 Roberts was widely acclaimed for his many years of public service, as both a 
prosecutor in Philadelphia and as the special prosecutor during the Teapot Dome 
scandal. As the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin wrote, “Mr. Roberts’s whole life in his 
contact with public affairs […] has shown him to be a liberal in the true sense, a 
progressive, forward-minded […]”27 
                                                        
24 Fish, Peter G., “Perspectives on the Selection of Federal Judges,” Kentucky Law Journal Vol. 77, 
1988-1989, pg. 20 
25 Leonard A Search For a Judicial Philosophy pg. 10-11 
26 Ibid. pg. 11 
27 Ibid. pg. 12 
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 On May 19th, 1930, ten days after sending Owen Roberts’s name to the Senate 
for confirmation as a Supreme Court Associate Justice, the Senate confirmed his 
nomination in less than one minute.28 
 Thus, Roberts began a career on the Supreme Court. He had been a lawyer 
his entire life, and had no judicial experience whatsoever before being confirmed to 
the Court.  
b. Roberts’s Outlook and Jurisprudence 
 Those closest with Roberts paint a portrait of a man who was anything but 
ideological in his approach to the law. Upon Roberts’s passing in 1955, Erwin 
Griswold, who knew Roberts’s since the 1920’s, remarked that Roberts’s “approach 
to […] problems” was that “he dealt with them as a lawyer. He was not a 
philosopher, and he did not attempt to be. He was not a sociologist.”29 
  Perhaps more interesting is Griswold’s assertion that Roberts was “rarely 
provocative, and never offensive. He was a lawyer […] not a crusader.”30 This 
sentiment was echoed by Roberts’s mentor, George Wharton Pepper, who wrote 
upon Roberts’s passing that “his beliefs were not of a complicated sort.” Wharton 
Pepper also levied a warning to detractors of Roberts, saying that “It is not wise for 
an outsider to speculate about the independence of [Roberts’s] thought” during his 
Supreme Court tenure.31 It was a subtle allusion to the many whom believed that 
Roberts’s vote in Parrish was irreconcilable and explainable only on the grounds 
                                                        
28 Ibid. pg. 13 
29 Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 3 
 (Dec., 1955), 336 
30 Ibid. pg. 337 
31 Wharton Pepper, George, “Owen J. Roberts- The Man,” The University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 104 No. 3, December 1955, pg. 374 
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that there was an ulterior motive at play. Other close friends have supported this 
description of Roberts. John Lord O’Brien, who knew Roberts for many years, 
asserted that Roberts always took a “pragmatic, rather than a theoretical approach 
to legal questions.”32 
 However, this rosy portrait of Roberts should be viewed with some 
skepticism for several reasons. First, of course, is the context of Griswold and 
Wharton Pepper’s musings. They were both written and published in memoriam 
very soon after Roberts’s passing; they were also published in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, which was published, of course, by Roberts’s alma mater. 
 Secondly, there is an alternative view of Roberts that is not nearly as kind. 
Upon Roberts’s retirement from the Supreme Court in 1945, then Chief Justice Stone 
circulated a letter amongst his colleagues that commended Roberts on his work and 
service to the nation. Although typically a formality, Justice Black took great issue 
with the letter, especially its final line; “You have made fidelity to principle your 
guiding decision.” Black said he could not “subscribe to such a loose interpretation” 
of Roberts’s jurisprudence, specifically how “from 1933 to 1937, he seesawed on 
critical economic New Deal cases.”33 In the end, Black so steadfastly refused to sign 
the letter with this line intact that no letter was sent at all.34  
                                                        
32 Leonard, A Search For a Judicial Philosophy pg. 12 
33 Ball, Howard, Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior pg. 13 
34 Ibid. pg. 15 
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 Griswold did not see a “seesawed” jurisprudence. As he wrote, Roberts 
“thought precedents and continuity were important, and he did not depart from 
them in any bursts of emotional enthusiasm. “35  
 
ii. Prior “Vote switch” 
 Being a Supreme Court justice is no small task. Over the course of his fifteen-
year tenure on the nation’s highest bench, Roberts penned an opinion in 353 cases; 
over 80% of those opinions were written for the majority. 36 
 A close look into this voting record reveals several startling discrepancies 
that cannot easily be resolved. In fact, on the topic of estate tax law, it is not 
unreasonable to say that Justice Owen Roberts had a “switch” very similar to the 
famous vote in Parrish. 
 A cursory glance at Justice Roberts voting record on federal estate tax issues 
reveals a judge who, time and time again, voted against the federal government. In 
the 1935 watershed St. Louis Trust Cases (Becker v. St Louis Trust & Helvering v. St. 
Louis Trust), the Court was asked to decide whether a certain type of trust could be 
considered a “transfer” of wealth (and immune from estate taxes), or if such a trust 
was merely a guise for avoiding these sort of taxes. The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 
margin, voted against the government. Roberts, along with the conservative “four 
horsemen”37 made up the majority.   
                                                        
35 Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” pg. 336 
36 Ibid. pg. 336 
37 Popular nickname at the time referring to Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter and 
McReynolds 
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 However, in 1940 that ruling was overturned in Helvering v. Hallock, where 
the same issue was presented to the Supreme Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
ruled for the government and deemed these trusts as liable for taxation upon death.  
 Owen Roberts was not the reason why the St. Louis Trust precedent had been 
overturned five years later. Justice Van Devanter, a member of the Court’s 
conservative wing, had retired in June of 1937 and been replaced by Hugo Black, a 
much more liberal judge. Justice Roberts, this time in the minority, dissented against 
the decision in Hallock, providing consistency with his votes in the St. Louis Trust 
Cases. Roberts was forceful in his denunciation of the Hallock decision, saying “to 
upset these precedents now, must necessarily shake the confidence of the bar and 
the public.”38 
 If this were the end of the story, Justice Roberts would be seen as remarkably 
principled in his approach to estate tax issues. However, the truth is anything of the 
sort.  
 In 1933, the Court heard the case Helvering v. Duke, 290 U.S. 591, which was 
re-petitioned as Helvering v. Northern Coal Company. It is a case that was not of 
interest to the public or the media, and there exists very little information on the 
case. 
 Helvering v. Duke concerned the same issue faced in the St. Louis Trust cases. 
As Erwin Griswold wrote in his memoir on Roberts, the issue in Duke “presented the 
question again in the following year.”39 
                                                        
38 Francis C. Nash, “What Law of Taxation?,” 9 Fordham L. Rev. 165 (1940),  
39 Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” pg. 344 
 22
 Griswold includes a footnote at the end of the sentence, which references the 
St. Louis Trust cases. The Duke case, upon further research, shows to be concerned 
with the same central issue as St. Louis Trust—conditional transfers of wealth, and 
the estate tax. 
 Griswold also goes on to explain how the Duke case transpired. Chief Justice 
Hughes recused himself from the case, due to a prior relationship with the 
petitioner. The lower Court had ruled against the Government, so it stood that the 
government needed to obtain five votes in order to have the decision reversed. A 4-
4 split would affirm the decision of the lower Court, and rule against the 
government. 
 That is exactly what happened. As evidenced by multiple sources, “a strange 
result followed affirmances […] by an evenly divided court.”40 This quote comes 
from Fordham Law Review’s “The Opinions of the United States Supreme Court from 
the 1934 Term”, and the “evenly divided court” phrase is footnoted with “Helvering 
v. Northern Coal Co., U.S. 290 591.” 
 Several questions arise. First, which four justices ruled against the 
government, and affirmed the lower court’s ruling? 
 Here, Griswold states, “the Government knew quite definitely in advance that 
four Justices would be against them-Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland 
and Butler.”41 
                                                        
40 Osmond K. Fraenkel, “The Opinions of United States Supreme Court for the 1934 Term--
General Issues,” 4 Fordham L. Rev. 416 (1935), pg. 453 
41 Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” pg. 344 
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 This would posit that Roberts would have voted for the Government, and in 
favor of the estate tax as applied to conditional transfers. It would be a vote 
irreconcilable with the St. Louis Trust Cases, which dealt with an identical issue.  
 However, how could Griswold have known that Chief Justice Hughes recused 
himself from the case, and which four Justices voted against the government? After 
all, the opinion was issued per curiam, meaning that the majority-voting bloc was 
anonymous. 
 It is a startling simple answer. Erwin Griswold argued the case, on behalf of 
the government. As the case notes read, “Mr. Justin Miller, with whom Solicitor 
General Biggs and Mr. Erwin N. Griswold were on the brief, for petitioner.”42 
Griswold does not mention this obviously important fact in his very brief discussion 
of the case.  
 Griswold’s biography supports this notion. He served as a special assistant to 
the U.S. Solicitor General from 1929-1934. He would be a prime candidate to help 
argue the government’s case before the Supreme Court. 
 The notion that Griswold argued the case on behalf of the government also 
provides mens rea for Justice Roberts’s vote. Is it conceivable that Justice Roberts, 
given the case’s very low profile and irrelevancy, would have voted in favor of the 
Government as a favor to his friend Erwin Griswold? Griswold, keep in mind, was a 
friend so close and dear that he was chosen, along with Roberts’s well-established 
                                                        
42 Helvering v. Norther Coal.Co. 
[http://174.123.24.242/leagle/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=1934484293US191_1458.xml&docbase
=CSLWAR1-1950-1985] 
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mentor George Wharton Pepper, to write a memoriam of Roberts in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review.  
 The only other option is to claim that Roberts somehow reversed positions 
between the Duke and St. Louis Trust Cases. However, given Roberts’s strongly 
worded dissent in Hallock, it begets the impression of a man who felt strongly about 
the issue—not one who inconsistently wavered between positions. 
 Griswold’s own words would seem to support the former conclusion. He 
writes that Roberts’s vote in 290 U.S. 591 (Duke) is “not so easy to explain.”43 
However, he declines to mention the one fact that might provide clarity to the 
otherwise befuddling vote: that Griswold himself argued the case for the 
Government. 
a. Conclusions 
 There is no connection, or skepticism, of Roberts’s successive votes in Duke, 
St. Louis Trust and Hallock in any material besides the bit mentioned by Griswold. 
This is not all too surprising given the low profile of the case and the per curiam 
opinion.  
  However, the fact that Griswold argued the case before the Court provides an 
otherwise unattainable firsthand account of what transpired, including which 
justices voted in favor of the government, and which justice recused himself. It is 
odd, but not all too surprising, that Griswold did not mention his involvement.  
 What a study of these cases does accomplish, however, is to cast a shadow of 
doubt on Roberts’s “pragmatic” approach to constitutional issues. As the Duke vote 
                                                        
43 Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” pg. 344 
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shows, it appears that Roberts could perhaps be capable of compromising this 
approach, even if just once or twice. There seems to be reasonable suspicion that 
there was an ulterior motive behind Roberts’s vote in Duke, a fact that would make 
any ulterior motive behind Parrish more likely. Given the estate tax cases, Roberts 
has shown a precedent for casting mysterious, contradictory votes with little or no 
explanation, a behavior that Justice Black noted in his strong opposition to the 
Roberts retirement letter.  
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III. Modeling Justice Roberts’s Voting Patterns 
Do not put faith in what statistics say until you have carefully considered what they 
do not say ~ William W. Watt 
 
i. Advanced Quantitative Metrics 
 Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish is conveniently referred to as a ”switch.” This 
label, however, takes a simple approach to a far more convoluted and multifaceted 
problem. True, Roberts seemed to have switched positions, in terms of minimum 
wage and its constitutionality, between Morehead and Parrish.  
 However, even that reasoning has been disputed, primarily by the 
“Internalist” camp. As Barry Cushman states in his piece, “Lost Fidelities,” it was 
actually Nebbia v. New York, a case that upheld a New York statute regulating the 
price of milk, which “heralded the death of Adkins.”44 Although Cushman’s 
argument, and the rest of the Internalist camp, will be discussed in greater depth 
later on, it is important to recognize a vital underpinning of the Internalist case: 
Parrish was not an anomaly, but part of a trend; it was a more predictable vote than 
otherwise given credit. 
 Thus, this section of the research hones in on that exact question of 
predictability or anticipation. In order to gauge predictability, it is necessary to 
establish an overall trend that details Roberts’s voting pattern. Because the Court at 
                                                        
44 Barry Cushman, “Lost Fidelities,” 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 95 (1999), pg. 104 
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the time was especially segmented, with a distinct conservative bloc and a fairly 
consistent liberal contingent, determining Roberts’s voting pattern is not as 
daunting a task as it may appear. 
 
a. The Ho & Quinn Study 
 Daniel Ho and Kevin Quinn, of Stanford Law and the University of California-
Berkeley School of Law respectively, released a study in 2009 that is the most 
advanced study to date of Justice Roberts’s voting patterns. They collected all cases 
that Justice Roberts voted on from the 1931-1940 terms, excluding unanimous 
decisions, and recorded whom Justice Roberts voted with. Thus, their research is 
focused on voting blocs and which bloc Justice Roberts joined with on case after 
case. 
 With the help of advanced quantitative modeling and metrics, including 
Bayseian learning, Ho and Quinn are able to provide strong evidence that Justice 
Roberts exhibited a sharp, significant shift to the left during the 1936 term. 
 Bayseian learning allows for a computer model to adjust its interpretation 
based on the consistency of voting blocs. Essentially, it uses this intuition to hone 
data and render more precise results. For example, a majority voting coalition made 
up of the “four horsemen” plus Justice Roberts would move Roberts further to the 
right because it would be a coalition that was very common during that time. In 
contrast, a coalition of Roberts, two conservative justices and two liberal justices 
(such Brandeis and Cardozo) would affect the data almost unnoticeably. This 
coalition of two rigid conservatives and two liberal members would be such an 
 unusual, one-off voting bloc that it would be treated in the dataset as
occurrence. Thus, after each case, moving chronologically from 1930 through 
Parrish, the system “learns” about the voting habits of the justices
tend to vote with. 
 Ho and Quinn, utilizing
statistical analysis studies. Here is one, shown below
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bloc more so than any other justice. Thus, his “ideal” vote, or preference, is with the 
conservative bloc. 
 Consequently, Justice Roberts’s “ideal” point is towards the very middle, 
verifying the claim that he was often the swing justice on a majority of cases. Chief 
Justice Hughes—often regarded as somewhat of a swing vote as well—sits directly 
beneath Roberts towards the middle of the chart. 
 Here, the chart shows that Roberts exhibited a distinct shift in voting 
patterns in the 1936 term. Because the pre and post Parrish terms are analyzed 
separately in this model, one can see how greatly the 1936 term deviated from 
Roberts’s traditional behavior. From 1936-1938, he is a more reliably liberal justice 
than Hughes, and there is a tremendous “rupture” that separates the two data sets.47 
This rupture signifies a marked change from Roberts’s behavior from 1931-1935. 
Moreover, he is the only justice who has such a rupture, let alone the fact that his 
ideal point line jumps nearly half of the graph. All of the other Justices are fairly 
consistent from pre to post Parrish, and even the Justices who do exhibit a change 
(such as Brandeis, who trends conservatively) do not do so in such a noticeable and 
shocking way. 
 Lastly, one more model depicting the dataset helps to emphasize Roberts’s 
dramatic shift during the 1936 term. This one, seen below, assumes that a justice’s 
position has been “constant” from 1931-1940. The top graph assumes that Justice 
                                                        
47 Ibid. pg. 28 
 Stone’s position was constant, while the bottom graph assumes that Justice 
Roberts’s position was48: 
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 However, the lower graph tells a much different story. Assuming that Justice 
Roberts stayed constant from 1931-1940, every other justice trended 
conservatively—significantly so—during the 1936 term. By looking at the lines of 
each other justice under the Roberts constancy model, one can readily see the 
dramatic upward shift of each other justice. 
 Of course, the lower graph does not demonstrate reality; Justice Roberts was 
anything but consistent in his voting patterns from 1931-1940. Thus, what this 
graph depicts is that it was not the other justices who shifted, but rather, Roberts 
himself.  
 
ii. Original Dataset 
a. Flaws in the Ho & Quinn Study 
 The Ho and Quinn study, while quite contemporary and unique, displays 
several shortcomings. 
 The structure of the study, in terms of case selection, is flawed. The exclusion 
of unanimous cases seems especially troubling. Although it may be true that 
unanimous cases do not usually touch on the most contentious issues of the day (by 
virtue of the lopsided vote) this is not always the case. One of the most important 
pillars of President Roosevelt’s New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
In Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, this federal statute was struck down by a 
9-0 margin. Here, while the unanimous vote signals that the justices 
overwhelmingly agreed on the unconstitutionality of the legislation, it does not lend 
credence to other qualitative aspects that are arguably more important, such as the 
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magnitude of the legislation under review and the constitutional (or 
unconstitutional) reason for its success or failure.  
 Secondly, the dataset compiled by Ho and Quinn is, as they readily admit, 
“over inclusive, by focusing equally on all non-unanimous opinions.”49 This aspect of 
the study is potentially more problematic. The Parrish vote, and the controversy 
surrounding it, was distinctly related to the New Deal, labor rights, and/or economic 
regulation. Including cases on free speech, for example, will shed negligible light on 
a voting pattern that is constructed to analyze a minimum wage case. 
 Ho and Quinn address this shortcoming by noting how their methodology 
“weighs” certain cases by giving greater emphasis to cases with repeating voting 
blocs. “A case with unusual voting coalitions will be down weighted by the model 
and will thus provide less information about the relative locations of the justices.”  
 Yet, they acknowledge in the next paragraph, “our analysis includes some 
cases that aren't necessarily the primary focus of extant scholarship.”50 This is 
somewhat of an understatement. There are a dozen cases, by their own admission, 
that are of no value to Parrish.  
 These flaws help produce an imperfect study of Justice Roberts from 1931-
1937. I submit that case selection should be the primary driver behind any 
developed data set that seeks to measure Roberts’s voting patters relative to 
Parrish. In order to truly evaluate whether Justice Roberts underwent a marked and 
sudden deviation in Parrish, a narrower study that focused on similar economic or 
labor issues will produce a more compelling and precise answer. 
                                                        
49 Ibid. pgs. 34-35 
50 Ibid. pgs. 34-35 
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 Therefore, while Ho and Quinn developed a tremendous statistical program 
for analyzing Roberts’s voting pattern, the shortcomings produce misleading results. 
Thus, I undertook the task of compiling a dataset on Roberts’s Supreme Court votes 
that would specifically hone in on case topic, and place less emphasis on non-
unanimous cases that dealt with a completely separate issue. 
 
b. Methodology 
 This new dataset consists of fifty-nine Supreme Court cases, ranging from the 
1930 term through the Parrish case, which was part of the 1936 term. What 
primarily distinguishes this dataset from Ho and Quinn’s is that these cases were 
specifically chosen based on the issue presented. 
 Supreme Court decisions are qualitative and interpretative based. It is 
important to reflect this quality in any quantitative study of Court cases. The 
qualitative aspect most highlighted in determining this dataset was relevancy to the 
Parrish decision. Parrish focused on a state law that mandated a minimum wage for 
all public and private employees. All fifty-nine cases fall under the general umbrella 
of economic regulation and/or labor rights, although they are not strictly reserved 
to cases dealing with state statutes. Federal legislation on economic or labor issues 
was also deemed relevant.  
 These cases were chosen by going through the United States Supreme Court 
Reports, Volumes 282-300 (which cover the aforementioned terms) and analyzing 
the decision reached in each case from those years. These decisions allowed myself 
to accurately glean the constitutional issue that the court faced in each case.  I did 
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not discriminate between unanimous and non-unanimous cases that fell into these 
categories. While I agree with Ho and Quinn’s premise that unanimous cases will not 
shed much light on Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy, these cases do promote an 
important finding: the direction of the Court. A study of unanimous cases allows one 
to ascertain whether the Court seems to lean “conservative” or “liberal” at a point in 
time.  
 It is important to also note which cases I left out of the dataset. There were 
many Supreme Court cases over these years that dealt with rates proscribed by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. If the question facing the Court had to do with 
whether a specific rate was fair or unfair (in terms of dollars and cents), the case 
was excluded. If a constitutional issue was raised, it was included. I applied the same 
standard to workmen’s compensation and liability cases. Any case before the Court 
that dealt with a fair or unfair sum for injury in the workplace was excluded unless 
it treaded on a constitutional issue. Usually, for these two subsets, the constitutional 
issue would center on the 14th amendment, as was the case in 285 U.S. 22 (a 
compensation case) and 284 U.S. 248 (an ICC rates case). 
 For each case deemed relevant, a few factors were noted. One was the central 
issue in the case. A second was the Supreme Court’s ruling and the majority-
minority split. The third aspect was the side on which Justice Roberts ruled. The 
fourth aspect, and perhaps most important, was whether the decision rendered by 
the Court was a “liberal” or “conservative” ruling. For the most part, these labels 
were easier to apply than initially expected. The “liberal” standard included any 
ruling that upheld state or federal legislation aimed at regulating business, or 
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upheld any law that was pro-labor rights. These rulings took a broad view of the 
Constitution, in general. The “conservative” standard took the opposite approach, 
and included any ruling that struck down a state or federal statute regulating 
business or proscribing labor rights. Generally, these rulings took a narrower view 
of constitutional rights. If a case could not be clearly determined, I took to a closer 
reading of the full opinion and (if available) dissent, and made a judgment. Appendix 
A denotes the full table that was compiled for each case.  
 To effectively analyze the data, the cases were divided into three tiers. Tier 
One included the most hotly contested cases, those decided by 5-4 or 6-3 margins. 
Tier Two included any 7-2, 8-1, or unanimous decisions with a concurring opinion 
written. Finally, Tier Three included only unanimous decisions where no 
concurrence was penned or voiced. 
 
c. Results: Tier One 
 The Tier One results are arguably the most important of all. These cases are 
the ones where Roberts’s vote mattered the most; they are the cases that were 
weighed most heavily in Ho and Quinn’s dataset for that reason. His judicial 
tendencies are most directly revealed when his vote mattered, as they were perhaps 
the toughest decisions to come to given the contested nature of the Court.  
 The chart below tracks Roberts votes in Tier One cases from the 1930 to 
Parrish. A 5 (the upward end of the y-axis) means Robert cast a liberal vote, while a 
2 (lower end of y-axis) means a conservative vote. 
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 However, Roberts shifts sharply, and statistically significantly, to the right 
thereafter. Over the next eleven cases that are very similar to the first ten in 
category and vote margin, Roberts voted on the conservative side in 10/11 cases, or 
91% of the time. It is an immense swing from the 70% liberal figure we saw in the 
initial ten cases. These cases span from the 1934 to the 1936 term, and indicate a 
sudden and quite verifiable switch in Roberts’s voting pattern.  
 This chart also indicates that the Parrish vote—the 22nd and final case in this 
subset—was an anomaly. It became part of the very slim minority (9%) of cases that 
Roberts voted with the liberals on; it could not have been expected by any outsider 
using this dataset in trying to predict Roberts’s vote. All indications here, in studying 
the closest Supreme Court decisions from 1931-1937, show that Justice Roberts had 
moved to the right by the time Parrish came about. Ho and Quinn’s findings support 
this conclusion, saying, “The late 1934 cases seem to suggest that Roberts may have 
become more conservative.”52 
 
d. Results: Tier Two 
 As stated, Tier One stands to tell the most about how Justice Roberts’s vote in 
Parrish should be understood. The Tier One cases resemble Parrish in nearly every 
facet. 
 Tier Two is important, however, in trying to identify a broader trend. Tier 
Two cases include cases with some contention, as they include any case that was 
decided 7-2, 8-1, or unanimous but with a concurrence, which indicates that the 
                                                        
52 Ho and Quinn, “Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?” pg. 31 
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ruling in Tier Two cases, which include the striking down of the NIRA54, until the 
1935 term, when in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority55 the Court upheld the 
federal government’s right to dispose of surplus electrical power provided by a 
private company. Here, however, while the Court made a “unanimous” decision, four 
justices signed onto a concurrence penned by Justice Cardozo, including Roberts. 
Not only is the kind of disputed case that would fall through the cracks of Ho and 
Quinn’s model, but it highlights a Court that was, if anything, cautiously liberal. 
 In conclusion, Tier Two highlights how the Court, as a whole, became slightly 
more conservative from 1934 through Parrish on issues that were generally agreed 
upon, but produced a modicum of disagreement.  
 
e. Results: Tier Three 
 Tier Three provides insight into cases completely unaccounted for in the Ho 
and Quinn dataset. Cases included in the Tier Three subset were decided 
unanimously, with no concurrence, and they provide an accurate snapshot of the 
Court’s general position on economic, regulatory, and labor matters over time. 
  
 
The axes uses the same definitions as the Tier One and Tier Two models: 
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 Taken together, this dataset presents a Court that, as a whole, seemed to 
become slightly more conservative on matters of regulation and labor around late 
1934-1935.  
 Justice Roberts stands as a microcosm of this overall trend. Amazingly, 
Justice Roberts voted with the majority coalition on 57 out of the 59 cases included 
here. Subtracting unanimous cases, which clearly distort the percentage, Justice 
Roberts voted with the majority on 24 out of the 26 non-unanimous cases. Of 
course, Justice Roberts was considered the “swing” vote on the Court, and that 
observation shows that this perception was indeed reality. 
 Moreover, understanding the slightly overall drift of the Court to the 
conservative side of these regulatory and labor issues makes the marked drift (seen 
in Tier One) of Justice Roberts more understandable. He was evidently not the only 
Justice who became slightly more conservative beginning the in 1935 term. 
 However, Justice Roberts’s drastic shift from a liberal to a conservative 
jurisprudence gains due attention because of the fact that he was the Court’s 
predominant swing vote. In 5-4 and 6-3 cases, his vote often decided, or helped to 
decide, which way the Court would rule. Looking at the Tier One chart, this shift is 
undeniable. The research done by Ho and Quinn verifies this slight rightward drift 
prior to the Parrish vote. Ho and Quinn also identify that Roberts moved sharply to 
the left during the 1936 term, when Parrish was decided. 
 What my dataset concludes to any reasonable observer is that Roberts’s vote 
in Parrish could not have been expected or anticipated by even the keenest of Court 
aficionados. On close cases dealing with issues very relevant to Parrish, Justice 
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Roberts demonstrated a sharp turn to the right beginning in 1935. As Tiers Two and 
Three show, he was also in line, generally, with the rest of his colleagues on the 
bench.  
 However, the fact that the Court moved ever so slightly to the right in the 
years proceeding Parrish makes Roberts’s vote even more surprising and 
unexpected. He was bucking a trend that not only he had established, but the Court 
as a whole had slightly established as well.  
 For the most part, this more specific, category-driven case dataset confirms 
the findings of Ho and Quinn, that “unless the cases in the 1936 term [Parrish] 
themselves are sharply different, they cannot be reconciled” with Roberts’s prior 
voting record. As the dataset shows, for all intents and purposes, Justice Roberts’s 
vote in Parrish could not have been predicted or anticipated. It was a “switch” in 
every sense of the word. 
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IV. Why did a Switch Occur? 
Why shouldn’t the truth be stranger than fiction? Fiction, after all, has to make sense 
~ Mark Twain 
  
 Part III of this research sought to clarify whether or not a sudden, 
unpredictable or unanticipated switch occurred. Given the compiled dataset—which 
focused primarily on the cases that were most relevant to Parrish—the answer 
seems to be a resounding yes. The contemporary and advanced metrics published by 
Ho and Quinn verify this finding. Justice Roberts seems to have suddenly altered his 
jurisprudence in Parrish and the 1936 term. The “switch in time” long 
acknowledged by popular history appears true. 
 The question now turns to the conundrum that has been ardently debated 
since the day that Parrish was announced on March 29th, 1937. 
 
Why the switch? 
  
 On this question, two fairly distinguishable camps have emerged with 
competing hypotheses, the Externalist division and the Internalist division. 
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i. Literature Overview 
a. Externalist Camp 
 The Externalist camp unites scholars, academics and historians who believe 
that Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish was due to outside political factors. 
Externalists “argue for the importance of politics,” in assessing the so-called 
“constitutional revolution of 1937.”56 Most externalists focus on political 
occurrences such as the 1936 Presidential election, which saw Roosevelt reelected 
in a landslide, or President Roosevelt’s 1937 “court-packing” legislation as the main 
influence behind Parrish. 
 The external hypothesis is thus slightly varied in regards to which political 
factor was the main contributor to Justice Roberts’s Parrish vote.  
 President Roosevelt’s Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, colloquially 
known as the court-packing plan, is a prominent external event given great weight. 
Laura Kalman, one of the renowned academics who attributes outside political 
forces to Roberts’s Parrish vote, believes that “the Court's anxiety about the 
possibility that Congress would try to curb it” contributed greatly to the sudden 
reversal in Parrish.57  
 The court-packing hypothesis has been around for many years; in fact, it 
arguably debuted the day after the Parrish decision. “Justice Owen J. Roberts 
switched from the ‘conservative’ to the ‘liberal’ side” wrote Turner Catledge in the 
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next day’s New York Times.58 A few weeks later, Yale Law Professor Abe Fortas 
exclaimed to a group of labor activists, “Mr. Justice Roberts’s theory must be a 
switch in time serves nine.”59 The idea of a switch in time that “saved nine,” which 
debuted shortly after Parrish, is a blatant reference to the notion that Roberts had 
succumbed to President Roosevelt’s assault on the Court. It was an assault that was 
led by the “court-packing” bill. This initial reasoning behind Roberts’s vote—he had 
done it to save the Court from FDR—was widespread from the start. Felix 
Frankfurter, at the time a professor at Harvard Law, summarized this sentiment in a 
letter to Roberts’s colleague, Justice Stone. The Parrish vote, according to 
Frankfurter, was a “somersault,” and “"incapable of being attributed to a single 
factor relevant to the professed judicial process. Everything that he now subscribes 
to he rejected not only June first last, but as late as October twelfth.”60 October 12th 
is a reference to the day that the Court denied a petition to rehear the Morehead 
case, the case where New York’s minimum wage law was ruled unconstitutional on 
June first. 
 However, the externalist camp focuses equally on the 1936 Presidential 
election—where FDR soundly defeated Republican candidate Alf Landon— as a 
factor that greatly influenced the Parrish outcome. This hypothesis is most often 
asserted by Bruce Ackerman, whose book We the People 2: Transformations alleges 
that the 1936 presidential election was the single most determinative factor in the 
Parrish vote. In 1936, Ackerman writes, “the People had embraced the ideal of 
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regulated capitalism with their eyes open […] the Old Court finally began to respond 
with its switch in time.”61 
 The externalist camp, of course, counts among it many other scholars and 
historians, many of whose arguments will be dissected later on. It has been the most 
traditional and widely accepted explanation for the “switch in time.” However, 
contemporary scholars and authors have spawned a contrarian viewpoint that 
seeks to dispel of the externalist idea. 
 
b. Internalist Camp 
 The Internalist camp takes issue with the notion that the Parrish case was a 
result of political factors that influenced the Court’s decision. On this note, the 
Internalist doctrine focuses on differences amongst cases, the changing way in 
which legislation was drawn (as a result of past Court decisions) and more technical 
legal matters as causes of Parrish. The internalist hypothesis does not generally 
believe that an outside ulterior motivation pushed Justice Roberts towards the 
liberal majority in Parrish.  
 The internalist theory gained wider recognition with the release of Barry 
Cushman’s book, Rethinking the New Deal. In this work, Cushman advocates that 
Parrish, instead of being an anomalistic or surprising outcome, was actually a few 
years in the making. Cushman points to the 1934 Nebbia decision—where Roberts 
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joined the liberal bloc to uphold a New York statute that regulated milk producers— 
as the true turning point in the Court’s attitude towards the New Deal. 62 
 In fact, the internalist notion can perhaps be traced back to as far as 1945, 
when Justice Roberts wrote the only explanation of his vote in Parrish. However, 
this explanatory memorandum was not published until 1955, and was released by 
Felix Frankfurter, who included the memorandum in his piece “Mr. Justice Roberts,” 
which was written as a tribute upon Roberts’s passing. Frankfurter wrote “Mr. 
Justice Roberts gave me this memorandum on November 9, 1945, after he had 
resigned from the bench.  He left the occasion for using it to my discretion.”63 
 
The memorandum reads, in part:  
 
"I stated to him [Justice Butler] that I would concur in any opinion which was based 
on the fact that the State had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins […] My 
proper course would have been to concur specially on the narrow ground I had 
taken. I did not do so. I said that I did not propose to review and re-examine the 
Adkins case until a case should come to the Court requiring that this should be done 
[…] it was that in the appeal in the Parrish case the authority of Adkins was 
definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it.  Thus, for 
the first time, I was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the 
Adkins case.” 
 
 
 Here, Roberts recounts the events preceding Morehead and then Parrish, and 
his rationale for voting the way he did in Parrish. According to Roberts, the Court 
had not been asked to overrule the Adkins precedent in the initial case (Morehead). 
However, he does say that he should have penned a concurrence to let it be known 
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that he did not subscribe to the entirety of Butler’s majority opinion in Morehead. 
According to Roberts, the important difference in Parrish was that the counsel had 
asked the Court to reconsider Adkins. 
 This memorandum allegedly from Roberts spawned the notion that perhaps 
the vote in Parrish was not a “switch” as it had seemed. Many internalist proponents, 
in this spirit, argue litigation strategies, or the wording of the legislation itself, had 
shifted between Morehead and Parrish.  
 However, other internalist theories, such as those focusing on the overall arc 
of the Supreme Court and its history, have also gained attention. G. Edward White, in 
his book The Constitution and the New Deal, argues this strain of internalist 
thought. White claims that the Court, when looked at historically, has always been 
slow to accept changes in constitutional thought. Using the child labor cases as an 
example, White argues that the Court has always been slow to respond to gradual 
evolving notions of constitutional authority, and that the “switch in time” was 
nothing more than a final stand by a Supreme Court that had once again been slow 
to change gears.64 This internalist theory does not depend at all on the Roberts 
memorandum, yet still emphasizes the institution of the Court as the main reason 
why Parrish occurred.   
 
ii. A Grand Unifying Theory 
 Any complete theory that attempts to explain the motivation behind Justice 
Roberts’s Parrish vote should provide a thorough portrait of Justice Roberts in not 
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only 1937, but the years preceding it. As the dataset shows, Roberts not only tacked 
leftward in 1937, but also tacked rightward in the 1934 term. The dataset also 
shows, quite clearly, that Roberts initially started out as a fairly liberal-leaning 
justice, siding with the Brandeis-Stone-Cardozo bloc on a majority of occasions from 
the 1931 through 1933 terms.  
 Drew Pearson and Robert Allen published a book in 1936 entitled The Nine 
Old Men which supports the latter assertion. On Roberts, they write that in “his first 
two years on the Court […] he voted with the liberals on every important case.”65 
 Additionally, as the dataset shows, Roberts shifted drastically rightward 
around the 1934 term, especially in cases that were decided by 5-4 or 6-3 margins. 
This finding is supported by mounds of qualitative works. Barry Cushman, in an 
essay for the Virginia Law Review entitled “Lost Fidelities,” advocates that Roberts’s 
vote in Parrish was not a sudden switch of any sort. However, he does recognize that 
Roberts underwent a conservative transformation a few years earlier, in 1934-1936.  
“We find that there were cases decided between 1934 and 1937 in which […] 
Roberts joined opinions invalidating statutory provisions […] implicated in Nebbia. 
It is therefore entirely appropriate to suggest that [cases within these years] might 
require somewhat more explanation.”66 Here, Cushman admits to the somewhat 
befuddling jurisprudence of Roberts, specifically his pronounced conservative 
transition in mid 1930’s. Louis Pollak, in a piece for the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, noted how Roberts “quickly aligned himself with Brandeis and Stone 
[…] the three liberal Justices.” However, in 1935, “judicial tide began to turn against 
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the New Deal,” primarily, as Pollak notes, due to Roberts’s shifting stance.67 Burt 
Solomon stated rather abruptly, “He [Roberts] had indeed switched—not once, but 
twice, first when he abandoned […] Nebbia […] then again […] on the minimum 
wage.”68 
 As can be seen, the ebb and flow of Roberts’s career on the Court seesawed 
from liberal, to conservative, to liberal in Parrish and the 1937 term. The basis for 
this study is to understand the reasoning behind Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish. 
Hence, in order to construct a more verifiable picture, the most accurate explanation 
should also clarify the reasons underpinning Justice Roberts’s conservative shift a 
few years before Parrish. If Justice Roberts does not move to the conservative wing 
of the Court in 1934-1936, then the Parrish vote would have raised few eyebrows. 
This time period cannot be ignored; it appears that the “switch in time that saved 
nine” is inextricably tied to Justice Roberts’s conservative movement two years 
prior. The dataset shows that the conservative trend was too pronounced for it to be 
ignored. 
 Thus, the need to explain the dataset—encompassing Roberts’s conservative 
shift in 1934 and his leftward shift in Parrish— leads to a primary argument that is 
often overlooked within the “switch in time” debates. It seems duly plausible, 
perhaps likely, that Justice Roberts strongly considered running for President of the 
United States in 1936, on the Republican ticket, where he would have opposed the 
incumbent, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It is an explanation that, besides being 
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supported by original research conducted herein, satisfies the entirety of the 
dataset’s findings.  
 
iii. President Owen Roberts? 
a. Context 
 Roberts’s rightward shift is first identified in 294 U.S. 500, Stewart Dry Goods 
v. Lewis (1935), where a 6-3 Court struck down a Kentucky gross sales tax that 
levied different rates on different volumes of business.  
 A few months before this decision was announced, the Democratic Party 
had—in the context of history—a rare midterm electoral victory. Traditionally, 
midterm elections trend against the President, yet in 1934, the Democratic Party 
gained nine seats in both the House of Representatives and Senate. In the Senate, 
they controlled 69 seats and in the House 322 seats, both overwhelming majorities 
that have scant precedent in the annals of American history.  
 However, despite Roosevelt’s reassuring midterm victories, unrest was alive, 
if not growing, in the United States. On the right, especially, a growing frustration 
with President Roosevelt, coupled with the public’s 1934 reaffirmation of the 
Democratic Party, forced party leaders and activists to reconsider their approach to 
unseating Roosevelt in the upcoming 1936 Presidential election.  
 One particular organization that arose after the 1934 elections was the 
American Liberty League. However, what separated the American Liberty League 
from other organizations, and contributed to its rise, was its recruitment of high 
profile political figures from both political parties. In fact, the four founding 
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directors of the American Liberty League were Al Smith, Democratic candidate for 
President 1928, John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee for President in 1924, 
James Wadsworth, former Republican Senator from New York, and Nathan Miller, 
the former Republican Governor of New York. Also instrumental in the Liberty 
League’s creation were Irenee duPont, wealthy heir to the DuPont estate, and John 
Raskob, former chairman of the Democratic National Committee 69 After formally 
announcing the creation of the American Liberty League in late August of 1934, The 
New York Times announced on page one that “the “League is Formed to Scan New 
Deal, Protect Rights.”70 Over the next two years, the Liberty League would become 
the foremost conservative organization in the country, with the explicit goal of 
defeating President Roosevelt in the 1936 election. As the Liberty League repeatedly 
stated, “If the League has taken issue with the New Deal, it is only because the New 
Deal has taken issue with the Constitution.”71 
 The Liberty League was not a coalition of grassroots activists and local 
organizers. Rather, it was a movement fueled by the wealthy, many of whom felt 
threatened by Roosevelt’s economic politics. As The New York Times noted, “The 
financial community sees in this movement a new force for conservatism.”72  
 Moreover, although the fusion of former Democratic candidates for President 
with a predominantly conservative cause seemed odd to many—Time magazine 
dubbed the League “a strange political nosegay”—George Wolfskill, who 
documented the history of the American Liberty League in Revolt of the 
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Conservatives, rightfully noted that “there was nothing strange at all about the 
association of these men in the Liberty League […] the realignment was taking place 
and the President was forced to a choice […] many of  [the Liberty League] felt that it 
implied an attack on the bedrock principles of the Republic. Others had a mutual 
dislike […] of Roosevelt. The forces were sufficient to draw them together.”73 
 The American Liberty League was first connected to Owen Roberts by Fred 
Rodell, in his 1955 book, Nine Men. Here, Rodell stated, “to exalt the Court for saving 
the Republic […] the Liberty League had sprouted fast and made many a headline.” 
He goes on to assert that the League was quite interested in drafting Justice Roberts 
to seek the Republican nomination for President on the League’s anti-New Deal 
platform. Roberts was, according to Rodell, by “no means unaware of popular 
interest in the Court, and its members,” in running for President.74 
 Rodell’s assertions are unreferenced; as a result, little consideration has been 
given to the idea that Justice Roberts seriously weighed a presidential candidacy in 
1936. However, a closer look into the matter reveals tantalizing and original 
evidence that Rodell, a Yale Law professor for over forty years, was not making an 
unfounded claim.  
 
b. Roberts Tacks Conservatively 
 Although Roberts had begun trending definitively rightward on the Court 
during the 1934 term, it was not until May 6th 1935 that the country would take 
notice as a whole. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton, Roberts provided the 
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deciding vote in a 5-4 decision that ruled the federal Railroad Retirement Act was 
unconstitutional.75 The ruling also notably declared that the railroad’s pension 
retirement system was unconstitutional. 
 Not only did Roberts provide the deciding vote, but he wrote the majority 
decision as well. It was an opinion that was vehemently anti New Deal, and 
espoused a strong laisezz-faire philosophy that outraged the left. In an editorial 
published by The Nation, Roberts’s opinion was denounced as having “a complete 
lack of common sense,” and was “a curious document.” Across the country, much of 
the outrage had more to do with the opinion written by Roberts than with the 
outcome of the case itself.76 
 The Liberty League, however, stood steadfastly by Justice Roberts and the 
ruling. The League asserted that the Railroad Retirement Act and other New Deal 
measures enacted in 1935 were “irresponsible deeds of a vindictive executive 
lusting for power.” In fact, after the decision in Alton, Wolfskill noted that the 
Republicans, buoyed by the activist Liberty League, “were showing signs of 
rejuvenation.”77 
 As our dataset shows, the Alton vote was not an outlier; Justice Roberts 
continued to vote with conservatives on similarly controversial New Deal measures 
as the 1934 and 1935 terms transpired. William Leuchtenberg, a scholar of the 
period, states in his book Supreme Court Reborn that “Roberts had started out as a 
liberal with an affection for [Justice] Stone,” until “he switched.” The nation’s capitol, 
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Leuchtenburg posits, began to speculate about what had cause Roberts to suddenly 
“shift allegiances.”78 
 The Supreme Court finished the 1934 term on a conservative bang. On May 
27th, 1935—colloquially known as “Black Monday,”—the Court unanimously struck 
down three Roosevelt policies, including the National Industrial Recovery Act in 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. The Wall Street Journal declared that the “Constitution 
had survived the New Deal.”79  
 President Roosevelt was so distraught about the result, especially the 
unanimity of the decisions, that he considered proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution that would allow Congress to regulate wages, hours, and labor 
conditions, among others. However, the Liberty League’s influence was so immense 
at the time that Roosevelt was too nervous of the potential political backlash to 
propose such measures. Felix Frankfurter, in a letter to President Roosevelt on May 
29th, 1935, wrote “on the issue of the Supreme Court v. the President […] a general 
attack on the Court … would give opponents a chance to play on vague fears […] and 
upon the traditionalist loyalties the Supreme Court is still able to inspire.”80 The 
Liberty League had become a threatening force in American politics. 
 Justice Roberts’s decisive vote in Alton had won him praise and recognition 
from the Liberty League and other detractors of the New Deal. They took notice, and 
began to mount a campaign to persuade Roberts to run for President. 
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 In June of 1935, only a month after Alton, the town of Macon, Georgia hosted 
a Grass Roots Convention where speakers and attendees sought to “counteract the 
appearance in government of the theories […] which are alien to America.” Wolfskill 
stated that “there was much in the Macon meeting to appeal to the Liberty League.” 
The convention espoused “basic views of the League’s philosophy.”81 
 However, there were more than just rhetorical similarities between the Grass 
Roots Convention and the Liberty League organization. In fact, much of the 
convention in Macon was paid for by the very same financiers of the Liberty League. 
Pierre DuPont, whose family contributed publicly and heavily to the Liberty League, 
donated $5,000 to the Grass Roots convention. Raskob, a founding member, donated 
$5,000 dollars to the convention as well. In fact, both Raskob and DuPont would 
state that “they believed in the principles” of the Grass Roots Convention.82 
 It seems likely that the Liberty League, with its eye on the 1936 Presidential 
election, did not go further in supporting this convention because of its overtly 
racist nature. At the conference, there were “obvious appeals to racial and religious 
bigotry,” which would have sounded a death knell for the Liberty League if they had 
chosen to publicly support the convention.83  
 Yet, there is no doubt, by DuPont and Raskob’s own admission, that much of 
the Grass Roots convention’s stance on the New Deal paralleled that of the Liberty 
League. In writing about the Grass Roots conference on June 13th, 1935 for the New 
York Herald Tribune, a Republican paper that would cover such an event, Theodore 
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Wallen stated that the convention “set the stage for the nomination of a strict 
constructionist of the Constitution, thus virtually eliminating Associate Justice 
Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court, while leaving Associate Justice Owen J. 
Roberts in a preferred position.” 84 
 Justice Stone, of course, had dissatisfied conservatives and Republicans alike 
by consistently voting with the more liberal bloc of the Court on the most 
contentious issues of the time. At the time, along with Justices Brandeis and 
Cardozo, Justice Stone consistently voted to uphold economic regulations, labor 
rights, and other New Deal prerogatives. In fact, he voted with Brandeis and Cardozo 
so often that the threesome became known as the “Three Musketeers.”  
 Walter Lippmann, a widely heralded American journalist, took notice of 
Theodore Wallen’s piece in the New York Herald Tribune. He wrote that “Mr. Wallen 
is an accurate correspondent, and his report faithfully reflects the fact that there is 
considerable interest in the idea of going to the Supreme Court for the Republican 
candidate in 1936 […] Justice Roberts, having decided against the New Deal 
measures, is to run as savior of the Constitution.”85 He would go on to write that the 
idea of Justice Roberts running as the Republican nominee in 1936 “is seriously 
considered.” If he hadn’t already, “Mr. Justice Roberts will be compelled to take 
notice.”86 
 After the Court recessed for the summer, the Liberty League continued to 
campaign against Roosevelt, and the prospects of a Roberts presidency continued to 
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swell with only one year until the nominating conventions. On May 26th, 1935, 
famed political strategist Arthur Krock of the NY Times detailed how the 1936 
Republican strategy “1(a)” was to nominate a “liberal conservative such as Justice 
Roberts […] All but partisan Democrats, New Dealers and radicals will rally to the 
standard.”87  
 The Hartford-Courant ran a piece during the summer of 1935 as well, 
detailing the cream of the crop Republican candidates, which they called the “Group 
A” of potential nominees. Roberts was included within the vaulted threesome. 
“Group A consists of three men who by experience and standing would […] occupy a 
stratum above the others,” Mark Sullivan wrote.88 On August 5th, 1935, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune published a piece that quoted Robert Lucas, former Director of the 
Republican National Committee, as suggesting Justice Roberts was being looked at 
as a potential nominee, given that “Roberts […] would make a logical Republican 
nominee, in a contest in which the constitution is likely to be the paramount 
issue.”89  
 As the Court commenced the 1935 term in October, Justice Roberts 
continued to vote conservatively on major cases, fueling speculation of a 
presidential bid. In U.S. v Butler (1936), Justice Roberts again voted with the Four 
Horsemen to strike down a prized Roosevelt New Deal measure, the Agricultural 
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Adjustment Act. And once again, most tellingly, Justice Roberts also penned the 
opinion for the majority.90  
 Ruling that the AAA was simply a “means to an unconstitutional end,”91 
Roberts’s opinion in Butler sparked a similar outrage as Alton had. Roberts’s fellow 
colleague, Justice Harlan Stone, wrote his sons “I doubt if any action of the Supreme 
Court has stirred the country so deeply since the Dred Scott decision.”92 
 Burt Solomon, author of FDR v. The Constitution surmised that Roberts’s 
opinion in Butler—not specifically the ruling of the Court—“sparked outrage all over 
the country.” Roscoe Pound, dean of Harvard Law School, “derided” Roberts’s 
“simplistic” jurisprudence that was akin to a “slot machine theory of judicial 
review.”93 The Harvard Law Review mocked the Butler opinion as taking a “novel 
approach” to the constitution, while Roberts’s own alma mater, the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, took the opinion to task for “purporting to adopt a liberal 
construction of the federal government’s taxing power,” while it “has in effect, 
created merely an indefinite limitation on the exercise of this power, the extent of 
which is known only to the Court itself.”94 
 Despite howls about Justice Roberts’s jurisprudence in Butler—it’s “House-
that-Jack-Built reasoning, as Justice Stone privately put it95— the decision won great 
support from conservatives, and especially the American Liberty League. Liberty 
League leader Al Smith gave a speech a week after the Butler decision that was 
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described as a “climax.” Wolfskill wrote, “Liberty League leaders would look back to 
their high adventure in January [1936].”96 A few weeks later, Liberty League leader 
Jouett Shouse would exclaim “Roosevelt faces almost certain defeat in November.”97 
Justice Roberts had once again provided the deciding vote in a watershed New Deal 
case. The Liberty League, whose entire existence was predicated on the 
unconstitutionality of the New Deal, had a figure of the highest constitutional 
authority in their corner. Senator John Bankhead of Alabama called the Roberts 
opinion in Butler “a political stump speech.”98 
 The harmony between Roberts’s interpretation of the constitution and the 
Liberty League’s continued. From January 1936 through the end of the Court’s term 
in June, the Supreme Court and Justice Roberts continued to strike down New Deal 
measures, such as the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co.99 Carter Coal was another high profile case involving New Deal legislation, 
but Justice Roberts also joined with the Four Horsemen prior to Carter Coal on a 
spate of other cases that garnered less attention yet continued his string of 
conservative positions on economic regulation and labor issues.100 
 As the 1935 term progressed, a variety of primary sources support the 
assertion that Justice Roberts was still under strong consideration for the 
Presidential nomination. Given the Liberty League’s growing influence and 
Roberts’s continued unabashed conservatism, it seemed only logical. On March 13th, 
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1936, The Evening Independent of St. Petersburg, Florida, published an article 
exploring the possibility that Kansas Governor Alf Landon would become the 
Republican nominee for President later that year. However, the news piece made 
sure to state that “some of the influential GOP politicos still […] express a feeling 
that a stronger and more perfect candidate […] is somewhere in the offing. They 
don’t mean Knox, Dickinson, or Vandenberg—whose last speech aroused no 
enthusiasm […] [they] mean Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court.”101 
 In May 1936, Fortune magazine ran a profile on Justice Roberts. In the piece, 
the author stated that because the Constitution was primed to be a major issue in 
the 1936 Presidential election, there was “considerable talk” of Roberts as a “viable” 
candidate.102 On May 3rd, 1936, The New York Times, in a preview of the potential 
GOP candidates, asserted “It [GOP] might offer the crown […] to Supreme Court 
Justice Owen J. Roberts.”103 Later that month, the Times reported that Roberts was 
set to receive a “favorable son” designation by the Pennsylvania delegation at the 
Republican nominating convention in June.104 
 Talk of Roberts being nominated for President in the first half of 1936 could 
come as no surprise to anyone, as Walter Lippmann, Arthur Krock, and others had 
identified his potential candidacy as early as the middle of 1935. Not only had 
various outlets explicitly mentioned Justice Roberts as a potential nominee, but 
Roberts’s was hailed in some quarters as a “perfect” candidate—a “Group A” 
nominee. That his name continued to be invoked with regards to the Presidency 
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attests to his conservative opinions in Alton, Butler, and other cases which endeared 
him to the Republican base and the Liberty League, keeping his name in the fold. 
 Pearson and Allen, in Nine Old Men, reflect this overriding sentiment. In the 
chapter on Justice Roberts, they write “before his AAA [Butler] decision […] he went 
through one of the most troubled […] periods of his life. His trouble was a disease 
which affects many prominent men in an election year- presidentitis.” There were 
many favorable qualities that Justice Roberts bought to the table, Pearson and Allen 
note. He was a “candidate with prestige and popularity […] [and had] the aura of 
liberalism surrounding his early decisions.” Moreover, Roberts hailed from 
Pennsylvania, a state which “commands the second largest vote in the electoral 
college.”105The authors concluded with the bit by saying, “Roberts considered the 
possibilities most seriously.”106 
 Clearly, Justice Roberts was mentioned often and seriously as a contender for 
the Republican nomination. His voting record aligns with someone who tried to 
placate a conservative Republican base, led by the Liberty League, with consistent 
anti New Deal rulings that ran counter to his prior record. This much is clear. 
Leonard Baker, author of Back to Back: The Dueling Presidency, agrees with this 
premise supported by my original dataset and qualitative research: 
 
 It was a suggestion encouraged by Roberts’s friends and members of his 
 family. It was during this time that his philosophy, as expressed in Court 
 opinion and votes, see-sawed from liberal to the conservative side. Finally, as 
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 the political suggestions grew louder, his philosophy became more in line 
 with what was considered the philosophy of the Republican Party.107 
 
iv. Associations Between Roberts and the Liberty League 
 However, previous mentions of a potential Roberts candidacy—by Baker, 
Pearson, and Rodell, among others—fail to establish any evidence beyond 
conjecture in the press, and quotes from Roberts’s family and friends who chose to 
remain anonymous.  
 However, as stated above, it is a theory that, if accurate, would explain more 
of Roberts’s voting record than any “externalist” theory to date. It would clarify not 
only Roberts’s vote in Parrish—made after Roosevelt was reelected, and long after 
his potential candidacy was extinguished—but also his rightward jurisprudential 
shift in 1935 and 1936, which made Parrish so surprising in the first place. 
 Looking at the situation through a general historical lens, the narrative 
advanced by Lippmann, Wallen, and others makes a great deal of sense. The 
American Liberty League was founded as a principally anti-New Deal group. Given 
that Justice Roberts was the face of constitutional opposition to the New Deal, it 
seems perfectly reasonable that he would be the Liberty League’s preferred 
candidate. He was most directly involved, even on the front lines, in the battle 
against the New Deal, and demonstrated a growing propensity for striking down 
New Deal measure after New Deal measure, a philosophy that meshed seamlessly 
with the Liberty League’s.  
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 No connection beyond these sources and parallels between the Liberty 
League and Roberts has previously been established. However, this paper will 
introduce originally compiled research that, as a whole, sheds an entirely credible 
light upon the notion that Roberts eyed a potential candidacy fueled by the Liberty 
League’s anti-New Deal platform. 
 
a. The American Law Institute 
 On August 25th, 1935, about two months after Wallen had stated that Justice 
Roberts was being mentioned at various Liberty League-related events as a possible 
national candidate, The New York Times published an article, entitled “Bar Group 
Studies Constitutionality of New Deal Acts,” which reported that the American 
Liberty League had convened a committee of 50 prominent national lawyers to 
“study the constitutionality of New Deal legislation,” and make an initial report by 
September. 
 This committee was branded, in the sub-heading of The New York Times 
piece, as being composed of “lawyers of different political faiths.” In the article itself, 
The Times stated that the lawyers were “serving without pay;” moreover, the 
committee would be conducted in a “strictly professional nature.”108  
 The implication that the committee would be independent and open-minded 
was a misleading one. As Wolfskill notes, “at least a dozen members of the 
committee held some important post in the League,” and perhaps most shockingly, 
the American Liberty League did fund the commission. Liberty League leader Jouett 
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Shouse appropriated $25,000 to the Chairman of the commission, Raoul Desvernine, 
for “such purpose as the Chairman of the Lawyer’s National Committee [Desvernine] 
shall authorize and approve of.”109The study was certainly far from independent. To 
this point, President Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, sarcastically 
commented that the committee was “Chief Justice Jouett Shouse [President of the 
Liberty League] and his fifty-seven varieties of associate justices.”110 
 The list of the participating lawyers that was published by The New York 
Times provided a reference point by which to research any potential associations 
between Roberts and the participants of the committee. In fact, Justice Roberts had a 
close association with two of the people on the list—via the same organization. 
 In 1927, the American Law Institute published a speech in the Michigan Law 
Review that was read at the “Annual Meeting of the Michigan State Bar Association.” 
The American Law Institute was describing a goal of the organization, which was to 
“make a statement of the common law, in its various branches.” The speech went on 
to describe how the Institute functioned, describing how the “governing body of the 
Institute is a Council of thirty-two members, and an executive committee of that 
council.” The speech then mentioned five lawyers who composed this executive 
“Council;” three being Owen Roberts, George W. Wickersham, and John W. Davis.111 
The latter two are lawyers who would later become members of the Liberty 
League’s National Lawyer Committee, and were listed in The New York Times as well 
as in Wolfskill’s account of the League. 
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 However, not only were Davis and Wickersham members of the sham 
“independent” council created and funded by the Liberty League, but they were also 
leaders of the League itself. John W. Davis, as previously mentioned, was a founder 
of the American Liberty League and regarded as one of “the big names of the 
League.”112 
 George W. Wickersham was a public leader of the American Liberty League 
as well. In 1935, the Gridiron Club performed a widely heralded mockery of the 
Liberty League, dressing in costume as only nine “Liberty Leaguers, Jouett Shouse, 
John W. Davis […] George Wickersham.”113 Both Davis and Wickersham were not 
only members of the Lawyer’s committee founded to investigate the 
constitutionality of the New Deal, but became prominent faces of the movement. 
 They were also associates of the future Justice Roberts while serving 
together on the board of the American Law Institute. According to the American Law 
Institute’s archives Wickersham was actually President of the organization from 
1923 through 1936.114 George Wharton Pepper, Roberts’s mentor since his law 
school days, co-founded the Institute and later served as its President. Wharton 
Pepper, as will be discussed, was a supporter of the American Liberty League as 
well.115  
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b. Roberts and J.P. Morgan 
 Davis had a long and noteworthy relationship with Roberts that extended far 
beyond the executive council of the American Law Institute. In 1921, Davis left his 
post as Ambassador to Great Britain to found and head the Davis, Polk, and 
Wardwell law firm. One of his firm’s major clients was J.P. Morgan; in fact, the firm 
considered Davis its chief counsel.116 Roberts, like Davis, was also heavily involved 
with J.P. Morgan. In fact, when the Banking Investigation committee analyzed the 
finances of the J.P. Morgan Co. during an investigation in 1933, it found that Roberts 
himself had been on a preferred stock purchase list which was the focus of the 
investigation. Essentially, Roberts had bought stock of J.P. Morgan “well below the 
market quotation.”117 This finding was one that would cause Roberts 
embarrassment years later when it became public knowledge while he served on 
the Supreme Court. 
 The list of preferred stock recipients, published by The New York Times 
during the Senate investigation of the affair, is revealing. On the list, aside from 
Roberts and Davis, are George Wharton Pepper and John Raskob, co-founder and 
prominent member of the Liberty League.118 
 The reason Roberts was so cozy with J.P Morgan, and able to purchase such 
discounted stock was due to his many connections to the firm. His “old friend,”119 
Sydney E. Hutchinson, was the son-in law of E.T. Stotesbury, a partner in the J.P. 
Morgan Company. Hutchinson was so close to Roberts that Pearson and Allen 
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identified him as making “highly important contributions to his business and 
political advancement.”120 Stotesbury, unsurprisingly, was issued the preferred 
stock as well. 
 Furthermore, Roberts had other personal connection to J.P. Morgan. Another 
one of Roberts’s closest friends who would make “highly important contributions to 
his business and political advancement” was Thomas Sovereign Gates, President of 
the University of Pennsylvania and a former partner of Drexel and Co. and J.P. 
Morgan. In fact, Gates and Roberts would become closer—they married a pair of 
sisters, the Rogers sisters who hailed from Connecticut. Eventually, Thomas Gates 
would jump back to an “important position” with Drexel and J.P. Morgan, and stayed 
with the two companies until his retirement in 1930—the year after the infamous 
stock purchase, which Gates participated in as well.121  
 Roberts also had professional involvement with J.P. Morgan. His law firm, 
which he founded in 1912 with two other partners, served Drexel and Company as 
one of its main clients. Drexel and Co. is described by Burt Solomon as an “affiliate” 
of J.P. Morgan122, and Roberts counted Drexel and Co. as a major client until he 
resigned from the firm in 1930 upon his appointment to the Court. During this time, 
Davis continued to serve as the chief counsel for J.P. Morgan, including in 1929 
when the firm sold Roberts the illegal stock. Stotesbury— the father-in law of 
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Sydney Hutchinson, Roberts’s dear friend—was described as the “head of Drexel 
and Company” in 1933.123 
 J.P. Morgan was a hotbed for the American Liberty League. Besides John W. 
Davis, a known leader within the organization, Stotesbury was identified by 
Wolfskill as a member of the Liberty League. In fact, Stotesbury was a prominent 
financial supporter of a group called the Sentinels of the Republic. The group was 
considered a sub-organization of the Liberty League, “one of the interlocking 
branches of the Liberty League.”  
 Besides Stotesbury, prominent financiers of the Sentinels included George 
Wharton Pepper.124Pepper was not only a financier but also a leader of the Sentinels; 
on October 18th, 1935, he delivered the keynote address at the official Sentinels of 
the Republic conference.125 Wharton Pepper is a key figure in the puzzle. He was 
described as having a “hatred of Roosevelt and the New Deal,” and had a “core of 
bitterness” towards the President.126 This was the man who not only mentored 
Roberts since law school, but provided for his entry into politics by recommending 
him to head President Coolidge’s Teapot Dome investigatory team. 
 Thus, Roberts’s association with John W. Davis extends far beyond being 
board members of the American Law Institute. Roberts was one of the select few 
invited to purchase discounted J.P. Morgan stock, an invitation that doesn’t seem 
surprising given his powerful associations within the firm: John W. Davis, its chief 
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counsel, close lifelong friend Sydney Hutchinson, the son-in law of J.P. Morgan 
partner (and Drexel and Co. “head”) Edward T. Stotesbury, and his brother-in-law 
Thomas Gates, another J.P. Morgan executive.   
 Only a few years after the stock issuance, it would be the leaders of this very 
institution—John W. Davis, politically, and Edward Stotesbury, financially—who 
would become vital mainstays of the American Liberty League. Roberts’s mentor 
George Wharton Pepper was also involved in the League’s causes. Would these same 
actors, Stotesbury, Wharton Pepper, Gates, Hutchinson and Davis—who had 
previously enriched themselves with J.P. Morgan stock—be morally immune from 
trying to draft close and accomplished friend Owen J. Roberts into a race against 
Roosevelt a few years later, at the behest of an organization, the Liberty League, 
which they led and funded? 
 
c. Roberts and the Wideners 
 A dissection of other associations in Roberts’s past ties him to the Liberty 
League even further. In 1904, still only a few years out of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Roberts accepted a job as an attorney for the Philadelphia 
Rapid Transit Company. He worked for Charles Leaming, the chief counsel for P.R.T., 
and became one of “Leaming’s ablest assistants […] He was worth every cent that 
P.R.T. paid him.”127 The Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. was a mega-corporation in its 
day, and was principally founded and financed by two “old money” estates: The 
Wideners and the Elkinses.  
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 The American Taxpayer’s League was another one of the smaller, single-issue 
groups that fell under the American Liberty League’s increasingly expanding 
umbrella. The American Taxpayer League, which predated the Liberty League by 
two decades, was run by “veteran conservative” James A. Arnold. A Congressional 
investigation into the American Taxpayer League found that Arnold had raised 
“nearly a million dollars,” almost exclusively from “a small group of utility and 
industrial concerns, prominent in them […] the P.A.B. Widener estate.”128 In 1935, 
Arnold raised nearly $45,000 from a small group of donors that included Irenee 
DuPont and “other DuPont's,” who were the most notorious financiers of the 
American Liberty League and its affiliates. In fact, the American Taxpayer’s League 
received free press and radio time from William Randolph Hearst’s New York radio 
station, WINS, and the National Broadcasting Co. facilities.129 Hearst himself was an 
expressed supporter of the Liberty League and supported a 3rd party candidacy on a 
“constitutional” platform for the 1936 election.130  
 The P.A.B. Widener estate, and all of its subsidiary companies, was 
principally run by Joseph E. Widener, who as an individual was a prominent and 
direct contributor to the Liberty League as well. In 1935, The New York Times 
reported that Widener had donated $10,000 dollars to the Liberty League131; the 
following year, he donated $10,000 more.  These figures match the donations of 
John Raskob, leader of the League, and Alfred P. Sloan, the CEO of General Motors 
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who, along with the DuPont’s, was a principal financier of the American Liberty 
League. 132 
 The American Taxpayer League, funded in large part by the Wideners, was a 
principal subsidiary of the American Liberty League. Moreover, Joseph Widener, 
who controlled the estate at the time in question, was a noted donor to the 
American Liberty League directly. The Wideners, given their Philadelphia roots and 
connection with Roberts early in his life, would surely have maintained a 
relationship with their former employee as he ascended to the position of Associate 
Justice on the Supreme Court. Given this association, and the Widener’s and 
Roberts’s intimate involvement with the city of Philadelphia their entire lives, they 
were certainly no strangers. 
 
d. Roberts and Pierre DuPont 
 Besides strong connections to Liberty League leaders such as John W. Davis, 
George Wharton Pepper, and George Wickersham, and financiers such as E.T. 
Stotesbury and the Widener family, Roberts had perhaps his strongest and most 
natural bond with a family who were both a public leaders and prominent financiers 
of the American Liberty League.  
 Pierre DuPont, whose wealth came from the DuPont chemical company, was 
perhaps the most prominent financier of the American Liberty League and its 
various umbrella organizations. The DuPont family, mainly Irenee DuPont and 
Pierre DuPont, contributed approximately 30% of the entire Liberty League’s 
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funding in 1935. It is estimated that one out of every four dollars spent by the 
Liberty League came from the DuPont family.133Upon the organization’s founding, 
Irenee DuPont was named as a director along with folks such as John W. Davis, Al 
Smith, Nathan Miller and James Wadsworth. 
 Pierre DuPont had a connection with Roberts that transcended politics. In 
fact, both were leaders of an organization that is built on forming bonds between 
individuals: the Boy Scouts, specifically, the one on the Horseshoe Scout Reservation 
in Pennsylvania.  
 Owen Roberts became somewhat of a savior of the Horseshoe Scout 
Reservation, according to their Alumni Association website. Specifically, Roberts 
was revered in the organization for undertaking a massive fundraising venture 
during the Great Depression that allowed the camp to continue thriving. According 
to the website, in 1930—only a year after the stock market crash—Roberts 
accomplished this by enlisting “some of the most prominent people in the County to 
aid in this effort.” It was no small feat: Roberts succeeded in raising $150,000 
dollars, (nearly $2 million in today’s terms) a success which earned him the 
distinction of being named Chairman of the governing council’s Executive Board.134 
 Pierre DuPont was a fellow leader of the Horseshoe Scout Reservation—and 
a major benefactor to Roberts’s massive fundraising mission. In the group’s history, 
Roberts’s fundraising drive was said to have “called on DuPont and other major 
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corporations” to secure the necessary funding.135 In fact, DuPont himself, many 
times, hosted various ceremonies for the Reservation at his home in Longwood. In 
1929, he hosted a reception at his house where he was awarded a statue “in honor 
of his service” towards the organization. Later, he hosted a “Council Camporee” at 
the same estate.136 DuPont and Roberts were not just members of the Boy Scouts—
they were together leaders of a specific Boy Scout Reservation, the Horseshoe Scout 
Reservation, which is located in Chester County, Pennsylvania. 
 In 1928, the alumni association of this reservation wrote about a Reception 
Committee, which met to bestow honors and new ranks to various members. 
Besides DuPont and Roberts, a man named A. Atwater Kent was mentioned as a part 
of this “prominent” committee. Atwater Kent would become a financial supporter of 
the Liberty League, donating to many of the same causes as the DuPont’s. 137 In fact, 
Atwater was specifically associated with the Sentinels of the Republic, the same 
Liberty-League affiliate that was heavily financed by E.T. Stotesbury and George 
Wharton Pepper. 
 Pierre DuPont and Owen Roberts were not merely members of the same 
Horseshoe Scout Reservation organization. They were both intimately involved with 
the group—Roberts spearheaded a notable fundraising drive, mainly successful due 
to DuPont’s donations, and later become Chairman. At the same time, DuPont, 
besides contributing significant sums of money, hosted a spate of Horseshoe events 
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at his personal estate and was recognized for his service and dedication to the club. 
They cared intimately for the Horseshoe Reservation and made sure that it would 
continue to thrive for generations to come. 
 It appears clear that Owen Roberts had enough very strong and close ties to 
the American Liberty League that Rodell’s assertion that the League had tried 
“drafting” Roberts to run against Roosevelt in 1936 is anything but a baseless claim. 
His well established ties with figures such as Wharton Pepper, Stotesbury, Pierre 
DuPont, Wickersham and John W. Davis support the sentiment voiced by Rodell, 
Pearson, Baker and others: Roberts closely eyed a Presidential run in 1936, and 
considered it strongly enough that his ever teetering jurisprudence swayed 
rightward. Among the American Liberty League, Roberts was close with several of 
its leader and a handful of its main financiers, through interactions spanning many, 
many years. If John W. Davis, Pierre DuPont, and the other leaders of the American 
Liberty League had wanted a “savior of the Constitution” to run against Roosevelt, 
they would not have to look very far at all. They would also not have to find a way to 
get in touch with Roberts. 
 However, there exists further original evidence that shows that Roberts held 
dear to his heart an issue that was a guiding principle of the Liberty League. 
 
e. Owen Roberts, The Crusaders, & The American Liberty League 
 The first mention of an organization called “The Crusaders” came in a piece 
by The New York Times, published on April 12th, 1938—after Roosevelt had been 
reelected, after the controversial Parrish outcome and after the Liberty League had 
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de-summitted from its apex. The piece discusses an investigation by a Congressional 
lobby committee into the “financing of the Crusaders and other groups hostile to the 
New Deal.” The article reports that the committee had found surprising results: 
Irenee DuPont and Alfred P. Sloan had donated $10,000 each to this organization, 
and qualified these donations as being “large shares of [The Crusaders] operating 
funds.”138 
 The association between The Crusaders and the Liberty League, in fact, runs 
much deeper than even the financing indicates. The Crusaders were a natural 
successor to the Americans Against the Prohibition Amendment organization, or 
AAPA, which was formed in 1918 to protest the 18th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.139 As Wolfskill writes, “The Crusaders and the Women’s Organization 
for National Prohibition Reform were more than auxiliaries of the AAPA. They were 
blood relatives.”140 
 The Crusaders were “young men […] who were scions of the wealthiest 
families in the land.”141 In 1933, The Crusaders, AAPA, and its brethren achieved 
their goal of Prohibition repeal. However, as opposed to dismantling, the leaders of 
The Crusaders and the AAPA, its parent organization, simply moved onto other 
initiatives. In fact, the majority of them focused on founding a different group—The 
American Liberty League. 
 In 1934, when “John Raskob initiated the series of early meetings that 
culminated in the formation of the American Liberty League, it was a simple matter 
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to summon […] members of the AAPA. The former executive committee of the AAPA 
was ‘unanimously of opinion’ to assist in the new organization.”142 
 These two groups were not just composed of similar members or even 
similar leaders. Wolfskill declared that the AAPA had become a “new organization 
[…] the American Liberty League.”143 
 The Crusaders itself persisted after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933. 
However, it was understood to be simply another branch of the American Liberty 
League. The Crusader’s “national advisory council […] all […] were members of the 
Executive Committee of the Liberty League.”144 
 In fact, one of those advisors who sat on the Board of both The Crusaders and 
the Liberty League was none other than John W. Davis, whom Roberts had known 
intimately through the executive board of the American Law Institute and J.P. 
Morgan. 
 Most importantly, Justice Roberts was known for exactly the issue that The 
Crusaders and AAPA formed around: Prohibition repeal. In fact, Roberts was very 
much an ally of the AAPA, and a strong public advocate for their primary cause. He 
was such an outspoken proponent of prohibition repeal that it nearly derailed his 
Supreme Court nomination. As Charles Leonard notes in his study of Roberts’s 
decisions, entitled A Search for a Judicial Philosophy, “the only serious objection to 
[Roberts’s] confirmation arose over his views on the 18th amendment.” There was 
ample evidence to support this wariness. In a 1923 speech to the American Bankers 
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Association, Roberts denounced Prohibition as a  “police regulation,” which violated 
the Constitution. In fact, he was so rabidly against Prohibition that he even refused 
to serve on President Hoover’s commission charged to investigate enforcement of 
Prohibition. The Sun (Baltimore) columnist Frank R. Kent noted, “there ought to be 
some opposition to Roberts,” based on his well-documented belief that the 18th 
amendment “has no business in the Constitution at all.” 145 
 Even the University of Pennsylvania, in a publication that detailed the life and 
legacy of Roberts, noted Roberts’s avowed resistance to Prohibition as one of his 
main legacies. “Somehow, Roberts managed to allay the fears of the most ardent 
supports of Prohibition,” despite his past statements where he had “decried the 18th 
amendment.”146 
 However, Roberts not only publicly supported the platform of the AAPA, but 
also had a personal connection with the organization. In fact, Roberts’s law 
partner—with whom he co-founded a private practice in Philadelphia in 1912—
would become the director of the AAPA a few years after starting the firm. This 
connection was so clearly important and obvious that it became the major source of 
Senatorial opposition to Roberts’s Supreme Court nomination. As the New York 
Herald Tribune noted at the time of the nomination battle, Roberts’s law partner was 
a “militant wet,” whose avid anti-Prohibition stance elevated him within the ranks of 
the AAPA.147  
                                                        
145 Leonard, A Search for a Judicial Philosophy pg. 13 
146 “Justice Owen J. Roberts: The Law School,” University of Pennsylvania Repository 
[http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=12&article=1009&context=penn_h
istory&type=additional] 
147 Fish, Peter G., “Spite Nominations,” Footnote 117 
 80
 Clearly, Justice Roberts not only had a myriad of financial and political 
connections to the American Liberty League, but also shared at least one area of 
common concern. Given Justice Roberts’s opposition to Prohibition as a well-known 
public figure, he was a vital ally to the AAPA, the Crusaders, and their related 
affiliates.  
 The connection is important because it seems quite viable that the thought of 
drafting Justice Roberts for President—after he became the driver against the New 
Deal on the Supreme Court—would relate back to his successful allegiance with 
anti-Prohibition groups that had then transitioned to the American Liberty League. 
Between John W. Davis, leader of the Crusaders and the American Liberty League, 
and Roberts’s former law partner—an association that nearly derailed his Supreme 
Court nomination—Roberts’s historical record demonstrates a consistent and 
marked connection with an organization and cause that formed the very basis of the 
American Liberty League. It was a cause Roberts vehemently believed in. Roberts 
had been affiliated with ‘Liberty Leaguer’s’ and their causes long before they became 
the American Liberty League. He was, especially given his anti-New Deal stance, 
undoubtedly one of them. 
 
v. The Nomination Vanishes & Roosevelt Wins 
 Thus far, this paper demonstrates that Justice Roberts’s name was 
consistently invoked as a potential Republican candidate, and that his votes in Alton, 
Butler, and other economic cases became more outspokenly conservative as the 
1936 election approached. Prior to the election, the American Liberty League had 
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transformed into a dynamic, bi-partisan association that was determined on making 
the unconstitutionality of the New Deal the focus of the election. Some speculated 
that the American Liberty League had fixated on Roberts as their preferred 
candidate given his position of authority on this matter. This research shows that 
there was indeed a marked and definitive connection between Justice Roberts and 
the leaders of the American Liberty League. Justice Roberts had close and personal 
ties with so many key Liberty League leaders and financiers that the speculation of 
collusion between the two seems certain.  
 Of course, Justice Roberts was not nominated as the Republican candidate for 
President in 1936. Nevertheless, a close dissection of the period leading up to the 
GOP’s June nominating convention in Cleveland supports the notion that Roberts 
keenly eyed a Presidential run. In fact, he may have so closely vied a candidacy that 
he ended up overstepping political boundaries that extinguished any hope of higher 
office. 
  
a. The Morehead Case 
 In Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, the final case of the 1935 term, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a NY statute that mandated minimum wages for all 
workers within the state. The vote followed the same formula as other contentious 
New Deal cases that came before: Justice Roberts voting to strike down the measure, 
joined by the “Four Horsemen,” with Hughes, Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo 
dissenting. 
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 The case was decided only months before the Republican nominating 
convention, held in June, and was announced just days before the convention. 
Morehead itself was the decision that provided the baseline for the outrage ten 
months later in Parrish. A close look at Morehead reveals that Roberts’s decision-
making ability had indeed been compromised by the “presidentitis” that Pearson 
and Allen had identified.  
 Roberts’s presidential prospects were nullified in Morehead because the 
decision provoked an “immediate and vociferous” backlash that eclipsed the 
negativity from Alton and Butler. Unlike the reaction to Alton and Butler, the 
Morehead ruling provoked criticism from all corners of the political world—even 
from Republicans and conservatives. As John Chambers notes in his analysis entitled 
The Big Switch, former Republican President Herbert Hoover agreed, “the Court had 
gone too far.” The New York Herald-Tribune, a Republican outlet, voiced opposition 
to the decision in Morehead. Republican Congressman Hamilton Fish notably called 
the majority ruling a “Dred Scott decision.” A study conducted found that nearly 
80% of all newspaper editorials disputed the opinion of Roberts and the Four 
Horsemen. To some, including “prominent” conservative Washington Post columnist 
Franklyn Waltman Jr., the fallout from the Morehead decision would give Roosevelt 
“one of the best political breaks” of his Presidential tenure.148 Clearly, as Chambers 
notes, Morehead “was one of the most criticized decisions in the history of the 
Supreme Court.”149 As Justice Stone noted in a quip directed at Roberts and the Four 
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Horsemen, “it is rather amusing to have Republicans and well as Democrats 
expressing doubts about the wisdom of the Minimum Wage decision.”150 
 The tremendous and genuine outrage that followed in the aftermath of 
Morehead was not confined to the general public. Chief Justice Hughes was 
described by biographer Merlo Pusey as being afraid that Morehead would be a 
“self-inflicted wound like the Dred Scott decision.”151  
 Other Supreme Court colleagues of Roberts, most memorably Justice Stone, 
expressed shock at Morehead decision. In writing to Felix Frankfurter a few weeks 
before the Morehead decision, Stone commented “I think there has never been a 
time in the history of the Court when there has been so little intelligible, 
recognizable pattern in its judicial performance as in the last few years.”152 After 
Morehead had been decided, Stone wrote to his sister that the Supreme Court had 
ended “the most disastrous term in its history.”153 
 Morehead is not only notable for the unique, bipartisan outcry that it 
initiated. Additionally, the opinion penned by Justice Butler seemed to directly 
contradict earlier decisions, such as Nebbia (1934), which affirmed a New York 
statute that regulated the price of milk. Interestingly enough, this contradiction 
would not implicate the Four Horsemen necessarily—after all, they had also 
dissented in Nebbia—but rather, would certainly implicate Justice Roberts, who had 
voted with the majority in Nebbia, yet ignored its basic principles in Morehead. 
Justice Stone would not leave this issue untouched, asserting in his separate dissent 
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that the Court “should follow our decision in the Nebbia case and leave the selection 
and the method of the solution of the problems to which the statute is addressed 
where it seems to me the Constitution has left them, to the legislative branch of the 
government.”154 
 According to a variety of scholars of the period, “most” law school journals 
and reviewers wholeheartedly agreed with Stone’s portrayal of the Court. Legal 
scholars and critics “tore [the Morehead decision] apart,” Chambers writes, “noting 
that the Court had previously approved such restrictions on freedom of contract,” 
such as “laws limiting the hours of work where long hours would be detrimental to 
health.”155 Roberts’s vote in Morehead was irreconcilable with his past positions.  
 The widespread outrage that followed Morehead would bury any ambitions 
of higher office that Roberts harbored. Unlike Alton and Butler, where his 
conservative jurisprudence had rallied conservatives and been praised by the 
American Liberty League, Morehead forced the opposite conclusion. As Rodell notes, 
it was the Morehead decision, the apex of Roberts’s conservatism on the Court, 
which “killed his chance for the nomination.”156 The nominating convention was 
held only eight days after the Morehead decision had been announced, and the 
national opposition that it garnered from every political corner rendered it an 
untenable position to take. 
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 Roberts’s political death in Morehead is no better exemplified by the platform 
of the Republican Party adopted at the convention. It read: 
  
 “We pledge ourselves to […] support the adoption of State laws and 
 interstate compacts to abolish sweatshops and child labor, and to protect 
 women and children with respect to maximum working hours, minimum 
 wages, and working conditions. We believe that this can be done within the 
 Constitution as it now stands.”157 
 
 The American Liberty League fully supported the Republican Party platform 
that was unveiled at the Cleveland nominating convention. Of course, supporting the 
Republican platform—which openly advocated for minimum wages laws, working 
hour limits, and other labor rights on the state level—put the Liberty League 
squarely at odds with Justice Roberts. Wolfskill noted that the Republican platform 
“was everything that the Liberty League could have hoped for.” In fact, Wolfskill 
goes on to say that “the amazing similarity between the Republican platform […] 
and the Liberty League Document [its own election year manifesto] suggested 
something more than coincidence.”158 
 By June of 1936, the national Republican Party and the Liberty League were 
nearly identical in membership, makeup, and financiers. Four of the men who 
designed the Republican platform belonged to the Liberty League and one third of 
the Republican “national finance committee” was composed of Liberty League 
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members. Most tellingly, John Daniel Hamilton, the chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, was quoted as saying “Without Liberty League money, we 
couldn’t have had a national headquarters.”159 The American Liberty League, for all 
intents and purposes, had been successfully co-opted by the Republican Party. Most 
importantly for this research, it demonstrates that Justice Roberts’s vote in 
Morehead not only made him a pariah amongst liberals and conservatives across the 
country, but made him an outcast in his own party—and the activist organization 
that had previously admired him as a “savior of the Constitution.” His presidential 
aspirations were rendered a pipe dream. 
 Roberts had misjudged the political winds. Although the Liberty League had 
conducted a focused effort to portray the New Deal as unconstitutional, a vision 
helped by Roberts’s votes in Alton, Butler, and now, Morehead, Roberts had 
overlooked the power of the establishment figures in the Republican Party. 
Although the Liberty League forced a fight on the convention floor over the 
inclusion of minimum wage and labor rights planks in the GOP’s platform, this was 
only a brief affirmation of Roberts and Morehead. By the end of the convention, 
“Landon’s [the 1936 GOP nominee] men had managed to hold their ground on key 
questions.”160 
 This cannot be surprising. After all, the Liberty League was an establishment 
organization itself, founded by former presidential candidates and party leaders. 
Recognizing that adopting the Morehead principles would be mean likely defeat 
against Roosevelt, and cause a suicidal fission in the Republican Party, the leaders of 
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the Liberty League knew that the protest on the floor of the convention over the 
labor rights plank was nothing more than a show. If it were anything more than a 
show, the party would be damaged internally and hurt in the eyes of independent 
voters nationwide. Thus, it was not the vote in Morehead that killed Roberts’s 
candidacy, specifically, but the makeup of the organization that most supported his 
candidacy. The establishment nature of the American Liberty League meant that, in 
their goal of uniting the GOP and defeating Roosevelt in November, they recognized 
that they would have to distant themselves from the Morehead decision. Roberts’s 
votes never made him unacceptable to the Liberty League, but it made him 
unacceptable in pursuit of defeating Roosevelt in the election, a goal that 
necessitated collaboration and compromise with the Republican Party. 
 This narrative is supported by history. William Lemke, a Republican senator, 
launched a third-party bid for the presidency that summer, but his candidacy was 
not supported by the American Liberty League or its affiliates. These organizations 
were behind the GOP nominee, Alf Landon, not because they agreed with every 
single position of his, but rather, because he posed the greatest chance of defeating 
Roosevelt.  
 Moreover, the Liberty League was not as powerful as an organization as it 
once had been. Consistent investigations into “lobbying, pressure, and politics” of 
the organization by Senator Hugo Black beginning in January 1936 had taken its toll 
by the time of the Republican convention.161 Perhaps the League could have pushed 
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more vociferously for a Roberts candidacy a few months earlier, but by June of 1936, 
they had undergone a “deflation”162 that curtailed its influence. 
 In November of 1936, the country rendered a decisive decision in favor of 
Roosevelt. He won in an absolute landslide, winning all but two states and nabbing 
all but eight electoral votes. The country, it appeared, had decided which vision of 
the country they preferred. 
 
b. Parrish, the 1936 Election, and Public Opinion  
 Parrish still remains the final frontier. However, the “devil theory,”163 as 
coined by William F. Shughart II in his piece, Bending Before the Storm, provides a 
logical and rational reason for Roberts’s vote in Parrish. Without presidential 
aspirations tugging at his jurisprudence, Parrish is a return to Roberts’s pre-1934 
voting history. Moreover, after the 1936 election, public opinion had crystallized in 
full favor of Roosevelt’s New Deal. By 1937, Roberts did not have to worry about 
backlash from his Liberty League friends in Parrish— and run the risk of losing the 
presidential nomination—but he had to be cognizant of continued backlash against 
the bench in the court of public opinion.  
 The so-called “Ackerman” thesis advances the idea that the Parrish vote was 
brought about by the electoral landslide in 1936 that saw Roosevelt win reelection. 
 This seems to be the case. As Jeff Shesol noted, Roberts was “a man who 
cared greatly, perhaps too greatly, about his public reputation.” Roberts was 
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described by a reporter as being “too anxious for worldly approval.”164 After failing 
to get the nomination—cemented by his broadly criticized vote in Morehead—
Roberts witnessed the country make a decisive and powerful decision in reelecting 
President Roosevelt. Suddenly, Roberts was given the chance to redeem his vote in 
Morehead, and do so without worrying about presidential pressures from Pierre 
DuPont or John W. Davis.  
 Moreover, the vote in Parrish was also influenced by outside forces that 
would have forced Roberts in the same direction, towards the liberal bloc. For one, 
Chief Justice Hughes dedicated himself to persuading Roberts to join the liberal 
coalition during the summer of 1936. Hughes, an adroit politician in his own right 
(Republican nominee for President in 1916) personally visited Roberts and his 
wife—after the “Roberts for President boomlet was […] squelched”—at their estate 
in Pennsylvania. There is rampant speculation that Hughes pressed Roberts on his 
jurisprudence during his 24-hour visit.165 
 Some speculate the President Roosevelt’s Judicial Reform Procedures Bill of 
1937 was the primary influence at the time; however, there are very valid issues 
with the “court packing hypothesis.” The most prominent is that Roosevelt did not 
announce the court-packing measure until February 5th, six weeks after the Parrish 
decision had been voted on. As has been established throughout many accounts of 
the time period, Justice Roberts indicated his desire to vote in favor of Washington’s 
minimum wage statute, and overturn Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) 
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immediately after oral arguments had concluded on December 17th, 1936.166 In fact, 
the record shows that the decision would have been announced much earlier than 
March, if not for Chief Justice Hughes. Because Justice Stone was absent at the 
hearing in December due to illness, the Chief Justice preferred waiting for Stone to 
return, rather than announce a 4-4 decision. The 4-4 decision would have created 
the same result, as it would have affirmed the lower courts decision to uphold the 
state’s minimum wage statute; however Hughes believed that a 5-4 majority opinion 
would provide a much stronger voice than a 4-4 split.167 This sentiment on the part 
of Hughes is both rational and understandable given the ire directed at the Court 
after the Morehead decision the previous June.  
 Of course, there is likelihood that Roberts knew of the “court-packing” bill 
before it was introduced, given the widespread knowledge inside Washington that 
Roosevelt intended to confront the Court if he won reelection in 1936. However, 
Hughes was aware that the perception that the Court was intimidated by FDR’s 
Court packing plan would dominate any speculation once Parrish was announced. It 
was for this reason that Hughes delayed announcing the decision in Parrish even 
after Stone returned to the bench in February. According to Marian McKenna, 
“Hughes realized that if the justices ruled favorably in Parrish right away, it would 
convey the impression that they were bowing to the political threat of court-
packing. Thus they delayed announcing the decision.”168 It seems as if Hughes was 
worried that the press and political world would get the wrong idea if Parrish was 
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announced soon after February 5th, implying that Court-packing was 
inconsequential with regards to the Parrish vote. Barry Cushman, in Rethinking the 
New Deal, posits that the justices knew that Roosevelt’s Court-packing procedure 
had minimal chance of passing, given the likelihood of a Congressional filibuster, 
thus further mitigating the chance that the Parrish outcome sought to derail 
Roosevelt’s attempt at reconstructing the Supreme Court.169 
 A more likely scenario—bolstered by the possibility that Roberts’s 
considered running for President—is that the 1936 election outcome, and public 
opinion more generally, drove Roberts to reconsider his previous vote in Morehead.  
 The 1936 election, despite some pleas to the contrary, did focus on the issue 
of the Supreme Court and the constitutionality of the New Deal. Barry Cushman’s 
analysis that Roosevelt did not campaign much at all against the Court is quite 
true—as I learned firsthand upon finding nearly no speeches concerning the matter 
in Roosevelt’s archives in Hyde Park. 
 However, that only tells half the story. As shown by Bruce Ackerman, the 
Republican Candidate, Alf Landon of Kansas, campaigned constantly and viciously 
on the issue of the Supreme Court. Three days before the 1936 election, Landon 
hosted a major, final campaign speech at Madison Square Garden in New York. The 
focus of his case to the public was, in fact, the Supreme Court: 
  
 I come finally to the underlying and fundamental issue of this campaign […] 
 the President has been responsible for nine acts declared unconstitutional by 
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 the Supreme Court. He has publicly urged Congress to pass a law, even 
 though it had reasonable doubts as to its constitutionality. He has publicly 
 belittled the Supreme Court of the United States […] will he attempt to get 
 around the Constitution by tampering with the Supreme Court? The answer 
 is: No one can be sure.170 
  
 As Ackerman puts it, “with such questions ringing in their ears, Americans 
went to the polls—and gave Roosevelt and the New Deal the greatest victory in 
American history.”171 
 The idea that it was the 1936 election results—along with the absence of any 
“presidentitis”—that pushed Justice Roberts to the liberal wing of the Court is 
supported by the rest of his votes in the 1936 term. In fact, if the court-packing 
scheme was the sole initiator of Justice Roberts’s vote switch it would fail to account 
for any reason why Roberts may have continued affirming New Deal measures as 
the 1936 term transpired.  
 To the contrary, theorizing that public opinion and Roosevelt’s sweeping 
reelection swayed Justice Roberts would also account for his votes later in the term, 
which touched on major New Deal measures. In National Labor Relations Board v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (1937), Roberts provided the decisive vote in a 5-4 
ruling that affirmed the constitutionality of the federal Wagner Act.172 In Steward 
Machine Co. v Davis (1937), Roberts once again joined with the “Three Musketeers” 
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and Chief Justice Hughes to assert the constitutionality of the unemployment 
provisions of the Social Security Act by a slim 5-4 margin.173 As Charles Leonard 
notes in his qualitative study of all the Court opinions in the first five months of 
1937, “the Justices arrived at some very liberal decisions;” the Court ruled in favor 
of state regulation at a six percent higher clip than in any of the previous three 
years. Most importantly, Justice Roberts dissented in only one case,  “making his 
record almost a replica of the Court’s line of decisions.”174 Moreover, these liberal 
positions are consistent with Roberts’s pre-1934 votes as far as economic cases go. 
The outlier, it appears, is the 1934-1936 period. 
 Finally, in a lecture at Harvard University in 1951, then ex-Justice Roberts 
addressed the tension between public opinion and the Supreme Court, saying, 
“Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular 
urge for uniform standards throughout the country—for what in effect was a unified 
economy.”175  
 There is no greater endorsement of the public opinion hypothesis than 
Roberts’s own words. It seems unshakeable, perhaps certain, that Howard 
Brubaker’s sarcastic line in the New Yorker, published soon after Parrish, rings true. 
“We are told that the Supreme Court’s about face was not due to outside clamor. It 
seems that the new building has a soundproof room to which the judges may retire 
to change their minds.”176 
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 However, there is a very important piece of the puzzle that has yet to be 
discussed. It must be analyzed for any legitimate theory on “the switch in time” to be 
put forth. This would be Justice Roberts’s own explanation of his reasoning behind 
the Parrish vote in the 1936 Supreme Court term. 
 
vi. Justice Roberts’s Own Words 
   a. The Owen Roberts’s Memoranda On West Coast Hotel v. Parrish  
 In 1955, Felix Frankfurter penned a piece for the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, which was written on the occasion of Roberts’s death. In that tribute, 
Frankfurter reveals a document that historians and the press had been seeking since 
1937: A memorandum from Roberts explaining his vote in Parrish. In the piece, 
Frankfurter explains in a footnote, “Mr. Justice Roberts gave me this memorandum 
on November 9, 1945, after he had resigned from the bench. He left the occasion for 
using it to my discretion. For reasons indicated in the text, the present seems to me 
an appropriate time for making it public.”177 
 For the parts relevant to this research, the memorandum reads: 
 
"I stated to him [Justice Butler] that I would concur in any opinion which was based 
on the fact that the State had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins […] My 
proper course would have been to concur specially on the narrow ground I had 
taken. I did not do so. I said that I did not propose to review and re-examine the 
Adkins case until a case should come to the Court requiring that this should be done 
[…] it was that in the appeal in the Parrish case the authority of Adkins was 
definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it.  Thus, for 
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the first time, I was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the 
Adkins case.”178 
 
 The reasoning advanced by Roberts, as seen above, is predicated on the very 
technical notion that the counsel for Morehead had never asked the Court to 
overturn the Adkins precedent. Justice Roberts admits in the memorandum that 
because this was the basis for his ruling against the minimum wage statute, he 
should have written a concurring opinion making that clear.  
 However, the basic premise of the memorandum is far from sound. 
Interestingly enough, a bevy of scholars have shed considerable doubt on the idea 
that the lawyers in Morehead did not ask the Court to reconsider Adkins. In The New 
York Times, lawyers for the State of New York took great issue with the sentiment 
that they had somehow not asked for a reconsideration of Adkins. As the Times 
reported, “Attorney General John Bennett maintained that […] in the petition to the 
Supreme Court for certiorari […] reconsideration of the Adkins case had been 
stressed.”179 Moreover, by signing onto Justice Butler’s majority opinion in 
Morehead, Roberts accomplished the exact opposite of what he expressed in his 
memo—he signed onto an opinion that stated “The Adkins case […] requires 
affirmance of the judgment below.”180Instead of seeking to overturn Adkins, as 
Roberts’s states was his wish in the Frankfurter memo, he doubled down on it. 
 Even if Roberts was not aware of the counsel’s desire to see Adkins 
overturned, throughout his career he had overturned precedents even when the 
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counsel did not explicitly ask him to. Just one year after Morehead, Roberts voted to 
overturn precedent in Swift v. Tyson, even though the counsel had “specifically 
denied that they were challenging that venerable precedent.”181 
 Moreover, if Justice Roberts’s did not desire to overturn Adkins, but felt that 
the regulation may have been constitutional (as he alluded to in the memorandum 
by claiming he should have, in hindsight, written a concurrence), he had the option 
of signing onto Chief Justice Hughes opinion, which had voiced those exact concerns. 
In his opinion, Hughes distinguished the New York minimum wage law from the law 
in question in Adkins, and was thus able to deftly affirm the minimum wage statute 
without overruling Adkins.  
 In fact, Hughes’s opinion was exactly the response that the drafters of the 
New York statute had hoped for when the bill was drawn up. Surprisingly, one of the 
two chief co-authors of the measure was none other than Felix Frankfurter, who 
purposefully drafted the law so that it could withstand a Supreme Court challenge. 
Frankfurter was all too aware that the Adkins precedent would be difficult to 
overturn, so the New York statute contained “actual differences” that were there “if 
Roberts had wanted to recognize them.” As Chambers writes, “Frankfurter and 
Cohen had drafted a minimum wage bill designed to express the legal pitfalls 
expressed in the Adkins decision.” Sure, these differences were technical, but as 
rightly pointed out, “they were no more technical than the point on which Roberts 
based his stand,” in Morehead.182 Furthermore, Frankfurter was an expert on these 
matters, heavily involved in politics and acted as a close advisor to the President at 
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the time; he would be appointed to the Supreme Court a few years thereafter. It 
seems quite unlikely that he would make such an amateur error and draw up a bill 
that could not be distinguished from Adkins, which, as he well knew, would sound a 
death knell for the bill on arrival in the Supreme Court. 
 Frankfurter’s involvement with the creation of the New York statute brings 
his association with the matter into question as well. In fact, some scholars, such as 
Michael Ariens, have accused Frankfurter of creating the memo himself as a way to 
protect the integrity of the Supreme Court, and defend his old friend Roosevelt.183 
Aside from Ariens, it is a legitimate matter to wonder why Roberts would choose 
Frankfurter to publish such an important memorandum. For example, after 
Roberts’s vote in Parrish Frankfurter scathingly wrote that with “the shift by 
Roberts, even a blind man ought to see that the Court is in politics.”184 
 Understandably, Frankfurter would feel this way; he had explicitly drawn up 
a measure that was designed to be distinguishable from Adkins, yet the Court not 
only ruled the bill unconstitutional but also declared it undistinguishable from 
Adkins. Why Frankfurter would recant his seemingly correct dismay with the 
Morehead decision and later agree with Roberts’s technical parsing of the Parrish 
vote remains somewhat of a mystery to this day.  
 Chief Justice Hughes also failed to see any reason why Justice Roberts had 
switched his opinion between Morehead and Parrish. In his published 
Autobiographical Notes, Hughes resisted speculation that the Court had been 
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influenced, in any way, by FDR’s court-packing plan, but then also noted, “The 
record shows that Roberts’s change of mind, whatever its cause, came almost three 
months before Roosevelt’s court proposal…”185  
 Chief Justice Hughes’s befuddlement with Roberts’s behavior was mirrored 
by the other Justices, most notably by an anonymous Justice who famously 
whispered, “What is wrong with Roberts?” upon hearing that Roberts had voted to 
overturn Adkins in Parrish.  Of course, these are the same people who would be most 
inclined to— perhaps not agree, but understand— Roberts’s point of view on the 
matter. Clearly, they did not understand his reasoning, and moreover, Roberts did 
not take care to clarify his shifting stance.186 
 For these reasons, there is enough evidence to shed substantial doubt on the 
truthfulness to the reasons expressed in Roberts alleged memorandum to Felix 
Frankfurter. Either Roberts’s recollection of the incidents taking place in 1936 and 
1937 was severely compromised, or he displayed adroit “sophistry rather than 
excess legal craftsmanship” in the 1945 letter.187 The oddities surrounding the 
contents of Roberts’s memorandum has been widely documented. William 
Leuchtenburg, a foremost scholar on the time, would not speculate as to the 
authenticity of the letter but noted “Roberts’s contention that he did not switch” 
seemed “unpersuasive” to many.188 It seems clear that this sentiment perseveres. 
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b. Justice Roberts on Higher Office 
 Doubts regarding the truthfulness of the Roberts memorandum necessarily 
imply that there was a hidden motive behind Roberts’s vote in Morehead. As has 
been explored in this paper, it seems that the most thorough explanation for 
Morehead rests with the calls for Justice Roberts to run as the Republican candidate 
against FDR in 1936. It was a calling made ever the more personal by his close 
friends and acquaintances— among them John W. Davis, the Widener family, George 
Wharton Pepper, AAPA leaders, boy scout buddy Pierre DuPont, brother in-law 
Thomas Gates, and dear friend Sydney Hutchinson—all of whom were closely 
associated with an organization hell bent on defeating Roosevelt in 1936 on the very 
issue that Roberts knew best: the Constitution of the United States. 
 After this vision was interrupted by the national and bipartisan outrage to 
Morehead and once Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 against a Republican candidate 
and Party which explicitly promoted minimum wage laws and certain labor 
regulations, Roberts had every reason to finally acquiesce to Chief Justice Hughes, 
who had been pushing for Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish ever since Morehead. He 
also had little reason to continue to oppose a President that had won a landslide 
reelection and was prepared to fight the Supreme Court tooth and nail. Roberts, 
regardless, had always retained a view of the constitution that would allow for 
regulations and substantive labor rights as was the case in Nebbia. 
 However, we have not yet looked at Justice Roberts’s own commentary on 
the matter, a testimony that supports this narrative. In 1954, Congress considered 
passing an amendment that would have prohibited Supreme Court Justices from 
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running for President or Vice-President until five years had passed since he/she 
retired from the Court. The Senate, perhaps tellingly, brought Justice Roberts in to 
share his views on the matter. More revealing are Justice Roberts’s own words: 
 
 I hope that I will be excused from naming names, but it is a matter of   
 common knowledge that ambition to go from the Court to the Chief Executive  
 of the Government has hurt the work of a number of men on the Court. Only 
 once has that occurred […] But the contrary has been true of a number of  
 Justices, Chief and Associate, of the Supreme Court.  They have had in the 
 back of their minds a possibility that they might get the nomination for 
 President.  Now, that is not a healthy situation because, however strong a 
 man' s mentality and character, if he has this ambition in his mind it may 
 tinge or color what he does, […] I happen to have a personal knowledge of  
 what that pressure is like, for twice ill-advised but enthusiastic friends of  
 mine urged me to let my name go up as a candidate for President while I was 
 on the Court. Of course, I turned a hard face on that thing.  I never had the
 notion in my mind. Men ought not to have the notion in their minds and 
 ought not to be subject to those pressures. 
  
 Roberts’s testimony fully corroborates all the evidence that has been 
accumulated in this research. While Roberts does not elaborate on which friends 
may have “urged” him to run President, it seems clear enough— given both the 
primary press sources and bevy of connections between Roberts and the Liberty 
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League—that the anti-New Deal Liberty League was the main proponent of a 
Roberts’s candidacy. Perhaps Pierre DuPont had pressed Roberts on a presidential 
run at an annual Horseshoe Scout Reservation function at his Longwood Estate, with 
promises of secure funding and powerful allies. Perhaps George Wharton Pepper, 
whom had guided Roberts since he was at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, tried to persuade Roberts over a drink in Philadelphia. Perhaps Thomas 
Gates, Sydney Hutchinson and John W. Davis advocated the idea at a J.P. Morgan 
gathering. What is clear is that these were also not just “ideas” thrown out by 
friends. They were serious considerations that could be implemented at a moments 
notice, given the League’s incredible organization and funding capabilities. 
 However, the testimony also sheds considerable doubt on the most 
important statement of his testimony; that “of course,” he never considered a 
Presidential run. If this was indeed the case, then why did he not, as Lippmann 
pleaded him to in 1935, “put to an end once and for all the idea that Justices of the 
Supreme Court are available candidates for public office?”189  
 Lippmann’s reasoning would be logical to Roberts if he had indeed dismissed 
any Presidential consideration so abruptly. As Lippmann put it, the notion of a 
Roberts’s candidacy would be “certain to cause acute embarrassment to the 
Supreme Court as a whole and to Mr. Justice Roberts in particular, especially 
because Roberts would continue to sit in judgment upon much of the New Deal.”190 
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 Lippmann’s assertion is proven true by the test of time. Had Roberts truly not 
considered a Presidential candidacy, a simple statement at the time when 
speculation was running rampant would have all but quelled the rumors. The theory 
put forward by this research would not have been suggested. That Roberts decided 
to address these rumors twenty years after the fact only suggests that it had been 
tearing inside Roberts for the last two decades, lending further credence to the 
notion that the idea of a Roberts presidency was not simply dismissed of 
immediately.  
 More concretely, Justice Roberts would not have to look far and wide to find 
an example where a justice effectively and directly shot down rumors of higher 
office. Justice Harlan Stone, who served on the Court with Roberts for many years, 
was also mentioned as a potential Republican candidate in the 1936 election. 
However, Stone took the rational approach that any person who truly did not 
entertain the notion of a Presidential campaign would take. As William G. Ross 
explains in his essay, Presidential Ambitions, “Stone steadfastly resisted their 
encouragement, explaining […] that justices ‘should keep out of politics.’” 
Furthermore, according to Ross, “Stone refused even to address the American Bar 
Association at its 1935 convention because he feared that his appearance would 
stimulate speculation that he would become a candidate.”191 Pearson and Allen’s 
observation that Roberts “considered the possibility most seriously,” seems quite 
genuine.  
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 These startling revelations also highlight a potential Freudian slip by Roberts 
in the testimony: The idea that the thought of a Presidential candidacy by a Supreme 
Court Justice “is not a healthy situation because, however strong a man' s mentality 
and character, if he has this ambition in his mind it may tinge or color what he does.” 
That logic, it seems, can and should be conveniently applied to Justice Roberts and 
his jurisprudence. 
 
vii. After the “Switch” 
 Soon after Parrish in 1937, Roberts’s status as a deciding swing vote on the 
Supreme Court would come to an end. Within a year, two of the “Four Horsemen”—
Van Devanter and Sutherland—would retire, and by 1941 President Roosevelt had 
appointed seven new Justices to the Supreme Court, remaking the entire bench. 
Roberts’s previous middle-of-the-road jurisprudence soon became viewed as more 
conservative, given that his new colleagues were supportive of President Roosevelt 
and the New Deal, in general.  
 Upon his retirement from the bench (as discussed in Part II) Justice Black 
refused to sign a letter congratulating Roberts on his years of service; he could not 
“subscribe to such a loose interpretation” of Roberts’s jurisprudence, specifically 
because “from 1933 to 1937, he seesawed on critical economic New Deal cases.”192 
         a. Pearl Harbor Commission and the “Dublin Declaration”  
 However, before retirement, Roberts would not leave the public spotlight 
completely. In December 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Roberts to head the 
                                                        
192 Ball, Howard, Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior pg. 13 
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commission that would investigate the Pearl Harbor attacks. Roberts’s selection, 
especially in the context of this thesis, could be viewed as an odd one. After all, 
wouldn’t Roosevelt have been wary of a man who had caused him great trouble on 
the bench only a few years earlier, and who had been rumored to run against him in 
1936? 
 In fact, this was not the sentiment at all. To the contrary, as journalist John T. 
Flynn noted at the time in The Chicago Daily Tribune, the selection of Roberts to 
head the commission was a “master stroke” by Roosevelt. According to Flynn, 
Roberts had been “screaming for an open declaration of war,” and would be sure to 
produce findings that would be pro-intervention in nature.193 Despite any tensions 
between the two men, the choice of Roberts was a politically acute maneuver by 
Roosevelt that he could not pass up. Roberts was a Republican, which Roosevelt 
desired when searching for a candidate, and also had an interventionist philosophy 
that would become clear later in life. Republican ideology at the time most closely 
aligned with isolationism, so Roberts held a rare combination of two traits that 
President Roosevelt sought. 
 Roberts continued to be involved in foreign policy issues after retiring from 
the Supreme Court in 1945. Most surprising was Roberts’s involvement in the so-
called “Dublin Declaration,” which was a fifty-member conference held in New 
Hampshire. The conference in Dublin—organized and headlined by Roberts—called 
for a “world government,” designed to go much further then the United Nations. In 
fact, the Dublin Declaration, according to The New York Times, advocated for the 
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creation of not only a world federal government, but a “world legislative assembly” 
as well, and called the United Nations charter “inadequate” and “behind the 
times.”194 The Dublin Declaration was essentially a call for united global governance. 
 Roberts’s involvement in foreign policy post-Parrish—as the head of the 
Pearl Harbor commission and a prominent organizer of the Dublin conference— are 
important considerations in the positing of this thesis. In fact, it seems, Roberts’s 
activities later in life further support the notion that his votes from 1934-1936—his 
major conservative swing on the Court—are categorically out of place when looking 
at Roberts’s career in sum. It is hard to reconcile the beliefs of a man who, in the 
span of less than one decade, went from advocating rigid conservative notions of 
governance, with little room for economic or labor regulations (see Alton and 
Butler) to calling for the formation of a world government that would harbor 
significant control over sovereign nations.  
 Sure, these two visions deal with very distinct aspects of public policy, the 
domestic economy and foreign policy. But philosophically, it seems that Roberts’s 
brief, but defined, conservative pattern from 1934-1936 held influence no longer 
than that two-year span. The next year, he would turn on that philosophy in Parrish, 
Jones & Laughlin, and Davis, and his foreign policy stances a few years later are 
consistent with these later votes, as well as pre-1934 votes in cases such as Nebbia. 
The two-year conservative trend is clearly, when looking at Roberts’s career as a 
whole, the true outlier. His foreign policy involvement later in life paints the portrait 
of a man who believed in the power of central planning and government; in the 
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Wilsonian tradition, his views on foreign policy would render him a true, unabashed 
progressive.  
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V. Conclusion 
Trust men and they will be true to you ~ Ralph Waldo Emerson 
i. Overview of Findings 
 Speculation regarding the motive underlying Roberts’s vote in Parrish has 
been alive since the day the decision was announced. To some, the “switch” could be 
attributed to the court-packing plan and pressure from FDR. Others theorize that it 
could be the election of 1936, and the growing public approval of the New Deal. 
 However, these two hypotheses only account for half of the equation and 
consequently only solve half of the problem. Parrish was only surprising because 
Justice Owen Roberts underwent a marked and drastic conservative transformation 
beginning in the 1934 term, a pattern that came to a halt after the election of 1936 
and was highlighted by his vote in Parrish. It is a shift definitively underscored by 
the original dataset compiled herein, which narrowed cases from 1931-1937 by 
both category and voting margin. The findings of this dataset are reaffirmed by the 
more inclusive advanced metrics study undertaken by Ho and Quinn. 
 This evidence suggests that more attention should be paid to Justice 
Roberts’s jurisprudence in the 1934 and 1935 terms. Without these conservative 
votes, his decision in Parrish would be only a footnote in the annals of history. 
Instead, his conservative trend during these years made the Parrish decision a topic 
of scholarly research for the last 75 years.  
 The one hypothesis that explains more of Justice Roberts’s voting pattern 
than any other is that he seriously considered running for President. The evidence 
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gathered in this research strengthens this theory, which was previously posited on 
the evidence that he was mentioned as a strong contender for the nomination by the 
press and other political observers.  
 However, the uncovered entanglement between Roberts and important 
leaders and financiers of the Republican Party and the American Liberty League 
lends new and strong favor to this theory. Roberts did not have mere connections; 
he had a history of very close relationships with a multitude of these individuals. 
These associations span from John W. Davis, leader of the Liberty league, to Pierre 
DuPont, a man whom he knew intimately through the Horseshoe Scout Reservation, 
to George Wharton Pepper, his mentor since the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School and prominent supporter of Liberty League-affiliate Sentinels of the 
Republic. The list continues with Edward T. Stotesbury, father in-law of lifelong 
friend Sydney Hutchinson and major financier of Liberty League umbrella 
organizations (especially Wharton Pepper’s Sentinels), to the Widener family, whom 
helped vault Roberts to prominence, to Thomas Gates, his brother-in law and 
partner at J.P. Morgan, to George Wickersham, fellow executive board member of 
the American Law Institute, to Atwater Kent, another man heavily involved in the 
Horseshoe Scout Reservation’s executive body who become a supporter of the 
Sentinels as well. 
 There was a common cause underneath these connections that had 
previously proven successful. Roberts was a public champion of the anti-Prohibition 
cause; this was the same cause that the AAPA, directed by his current law firm 
founder and partner, used to become the foremost anti-Prohibition organization in 
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the land. The AAPA then transformed, post a victorious Prohibition repeal, into the 
American Liberty League, the same organization with a different name. 
 Roberts admitted in Senate testimony that “two friends” of his had, on 
several occasions, urged him to run for President. We can now take a strong guess 
as to which “friends” he was referring to.  
 In his testimony, Roberts also made sure to note that he dismissed these 
suggestions immediately. However, actions speak louder than words. Instead of 
publicly dismissing these presidential ambitions, as his colleague Justice Stone had, 
Roberts took the confounding route of keeping silent, which only served to spark, 
not quell, speculation of a Roberts candidacy. His remarkable about-face in Parrish 
came, not surprisingly, once his prospective candidacy was extinguished and 
Roosevelt had been reelected by historical margins.  
 
ii. Implications of this Thesis 
 The simple, yet consequential question thus only remains: Did these personal 
influences and ambitious desires actually cause Justice Roberts’s to vote 
conservatively from 1935-1936? 
 
It seems that now, more than ever, the answer to that question may be yes. 
 
 There is a substantial chance that Roberts always had the notion in the back 
of his mind, enough so that he would not dismiss it forthrightly. For a swing voter 
such as Justice Roberts, this idea alive in the back of his mind would be more than 
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enough to make him tack conservatively when was on the fence. It strains credulity 
to think that all of his friends and acquaintances affiliated with the Liberty League 
did not vociferously push Roberts to pursue an anti New Deal agenda. Perhaps these 
persuasions were paired with the promise that, if possible, the League would unite 
behind Roberts at the Republican convention in June. After all, Pierre DuPont and 
E.T. Stotesbury did not contribute massive sums of money to the Liberty League for 
it to be inconsequential in the 1936 election. What greater impact could the League 
have than fielding a candidate who was a source of authority on the issue that 
mattered to them most, the Constitution? And what better choice than DuPont’s Boy 
Scout colleague, Wharton Pepper’s mentee, and Thomas Gates’s brother-in-law, 
Owen Roberts?  
 Many of the Liberty League’s leaders, such as John W. Davis and Al Smith, 
were initially supporters of President Roosevelt, but formed the Liberty League 
because he had violated their trust and values. Owen Roberts represented the 
opposite. He was a man they could trust; many of them had known him for a long 
period of time. He had fought with them against Prohibition, and was fighting with 
them against the New Deal from the Supreme Court. 
 Roberts followed a conservative jurisprudence, very much aware of the 
strong possibility that his political allies would return the favor at the Republican 
Convention. However, Roberts crucially mis-stepped with Morehead. Although the 
ruling was not anathema to the Liberty League, it was to the Republican Party. More 
importantly, it was a decision that could not be supported if the Liberty League and 
GOP had any hope in the November election.  
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 This was the one goal above all else, and the establishment figures that led 
the Liberty League knew it. Nominating Roberts was no longer a possibility. 
 This once-burning presidential desire caused Roberts a great deal of stress 
when, after the election had concluded, he knew that he disagreed with the tenets of 
Adkins and Morehead, and thus voted to overturn them in Parrish. His ambition 
extinguished, he could no longer ignore growing public opinion favoring the New 
Deal. His rightward drift on the Court was a period in his life that he was so ashamed 
of that he would take it with him to his grave—quite literally.  Frankfurter would 
not publish the memo until after Roberts’s death, a fact that seems too coincidental 
given the circumstance. 
 He only desired to confront the questions surrounding the confusing votes of 
Morehead and Parrish once he was no longer around to face the inevitable scrutiny, 
and perhaps, the truth. 
 
iii. Final Considerations 
 The conclusion of this research is thrice folded. One, Justice Roberts 
underwent not one switch, but two. First, he moved to the right on matters of 
economic regulation and labor rights during the latter half of the 1934 term.  
 Secondly, he switched again in the 1936 term, starting with Parrish, and 
sided with the liberal coalition on the same category of issues. The vote in Parrish 
marked a return to his pre-1934 decisions such as Nebbia. 
 Third, and finally, the reason why Justice Roberts “seesawed” between these 
two coalitions had to do with the fact that he considered, for a few months between 
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1935 and 1936, the prospect of running for President. He entertained the notion—
which was a very real one— just enough that it swayed his middle-of-the-road 
jurisprudence.  
 Scholars of the time period, whom I spoke with personally, such as Jeff 
Shesol, Laura Kalman, and William G. Ross, find that the thesis herein is an 
intriguing and plausible one. They all correctly note that there is no “smoking gun,” 
which leaves the argument as intriguing rather than irrefutable.   
 However, there will never be a “smoking gun” with regards to the “switch in 
time that saved nine,” unless a document is recovered from Roberts’s attic that 
reveals his true intentions.  
 Moreover, there is no ‘smoking gun’ to the Court-packing hypothesis; there is 
no smoking gun to the public-opinion theory; there is no smoking gun to the 
Internalist argument. The thesis posited here falls in line with the above. Thus, those 
involved in the study of “the switch in time” can only hope to continue building a 
constructive narrative that continues to clarify the confounding story and fill in the 
gaps.  
 I am of the opinion that Justice Roberts’s votes in Morehead and Parrish 
derived from a desire to run for president in 1936. I cannot ignore the conclusions 
reached from the dataset. The evidence gathered uncovers close connection after 
close connection between Roberts and the American Liberty League. Together, these 
two original findings support one another. 
 The “switch in time that saved nine” has heretofore been remanded for 
further hearings. 
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Appendix A: Dataset Cases 
Case 
# Issue Roberts's Vote Dissent 
Roberts's 
Position 
     
282 
U.S. 
251 
NJ regulation of 
insurance 
commission 
With majority, 
upholding law Four Horseman Liberal 
283 
U.S. 
35 ICC Regulation Pro-ICC N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
283 
U.S. 
249 
State regulation of 
railroads brakes 
Uphold 
regulation N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
283 
U.S. 
380 
Mandating Public 
Utilities Pro state McReynolds Liberal 
283 
U.S. 
527 
Mandate state 
licensing of any 
business Pro state Four Horseman Liberal 
284 
U.S. 
80 ICC regulatory rules Against state 
Stone, Holmes, 
Brandeis Conservative 
284 
U.S. 
248 
ICC maximum rates 
via due process 
Against 
ICC/state N/A- Unanimous Conservative 
285 
U.S. 
22 
Substantive due 
process in 
compensation 
Pro-worker and 
state 
Roberts, Brandeis, 
Stone Liberal 
285 
U.S. 
234 
Massachussetts 
workmen comp. Pro-state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
285 
U.S. 
393 
Oklahoma Oil 
Taxation rights Pro state 
Roberts, Stone, 
Brandeis, Cardozo Liberal 
286 
U.S. 
210 
OK law regulating 
production of 
petroleum 
Anti 
regulation/state N/A- Unanimous Conservative 
286 
U.S. 
352 
Motor Vehicle Act of 
Kansas Pro-state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
286 
U.S. 
472 
South Carolina Gas 
Tax Pro-tax/state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
287 
U.S. 
251 
TX regulation of 
truck driver 
licensing Pro regulation Butler Liberal 
287 
U.S. 
283 
ND law allowing 
consumer item 
return Pro state 
Unanimous w/ 
Stone & Cardozo 
concurrence Liberal 
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288 
U.S. 
14 
ICC mandate to 
build more tracks 
Anti 
ICC/regulation 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
288 
U.S. 
517 
FL requiring state 
licensing of business 
Anti 
state/regulation 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
290 
U.S. 
326 
S.C. regulation of 
banks 
Pro state law 
(against 
regulation) 
Roberts, 
Sutherland, Butler, 
McReynolds Liberal 
290 
U.S. 
398 
Emergency Relief 
Act of Minnesota Pro state Four Horseman Liberal 
290 
U.S. 
570 
Nebraska regulation 
of bread sales Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
291 
U.S. 
300 
Washington tax on 
different businesses Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
291 
U.S. 
352 
Mississippi law 
protecting 
contractors Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
291 
U.S. 
502 
NY law regulating 
price of milk Pro state Four Horseman Liberal 
291 
U.S. 
619 
Seattle municipal 
tax Pro tax/state 
Unanimous w/ Four 
Horseman 
concurrence Liberal 
292 
U.S. 
263 NH tax on peddlers Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
293 
U.S. 
163 
NY law regulating 
milk sales Pro state 
Unanimous w/ 
Sutherland 
concurrence Liberal 
293 
U.S. 
194 NY milk law Anti state 
Unanimous w/ 
Stone & Cardozo 
concurrence Conservative 
293 
U.S. 
388 
Presidential 
Authority in NIRA Anti state Cardozo Conservative 
294 
U.S. 
169 PA liquid/fuel tax Pro tax/state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
294 
U.S. 
240 U.S. anti-gold law 
Pro 
state/regulation Four Horseman Liberal 
294 
U.S. 
384 
Montana business 
licensing taxes Anti tax/state N/A- Unanimous Conservative 
294 
U.S. 
405 
Tennessee Highway 
Regulation Anti state Stone, Cardozo Conservative 
294 NY milk law in Anti state N/A- Unanimous Conservative 
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U.S. 
514 
interstate commerce 
294 
U.S. 
550 
Kentucky Gross 
sales tax Anti tax/state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
294 
U.S. 
608 
Oregon Dentist 
Regulations Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
295 
U.S. 
76 
Maine law regulating 
carriers Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
295 
U.S. 
89 
NY violating of 
compensation in 
Motor Vehicle Act Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
295 
U.S. 
165 
GA city imposing tax 
on paving streets Anti tax/state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
295 
U.S. 
285 GA Motor Carrier Act Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
295 
U.S. 
330 
Railroad Retirement 
Act Anti state 
Hughes, Cardozo, 
Brandeis, Stone Conservative 
295 
U.S. 
495 
Constitutionality of 
NIRA Anti state 
Unanimous w/ 
Stone & Cardozo 
concurrence Conservative 
296 
U.S. 
176 
Dept of Agriculture 
packaging 
regulations Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
296 
U.S. 
315 
Homeowners loan 
act regarding states Anti state N/A- Unanimous Conservative 
296 
U.S. 
404 
Vermont business 
tax Anti state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
297 
U.S. 
1 
Agricultural 
Adjustment Act Anti state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
297 
U.S. 
135 ND 'excessive' tax Anti tax/state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
297 
U.S. 
189 
LA law changing 
right of associations Anti state N/A- Unanimous Conservative 
297 
U.S. 
251 
NY Milk control law, 
14th amendment 
due process Pro state Four Horseman Liberal 
297 
U.S. 
266 
NY milk licensing 
law 
Anti 
state/regulation 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
297 
U.S. 
Fed Gov't 
contracting rights Pro state 
Unanimous w/ 
Roberts, 4 others Liberal 
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288 concurring 
297 
U.S. 
422 
CA 'Fish & Game' 
regulations Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
298 
U.S. 
1 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
regulation 
Anti 
regulation/state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
298 
U.S. 
238 
Coal Conservation 
Act Anti state 
Stone, Brandeis, 
Cardozo Conservative 
298 
U.S. 
349 
Railroad 
Commission Rules Pro state 
Unanimous w/ 
Stone, Cardozo, 
Brandeis Roberts 
concurring Liberal 
298 
U.S. 
587 
NY Minimum wage 
law 
Anti 
regulation/state 
Hughes, Cardozo, 
Brandeis, Stone Conservative 
299 
U.S. 
33 
TX tax on 
production of oil Pro tax/state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
299 
U.S. 
183 
Fair Trade Act of 
Illinois Pro state N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
299 
U.S. 
387 
Truckdriver 
regulation 
ordinance, Illinois 
Pro 
state/regulation N/A- Unanimous Liberal 
300 
U.S. 
379 Parrish Pro state Four Horseman Liberal 
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